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 Executive Summary 
The objective of this study is to provide a synthesis of historical and contemporary processes of 
large-scale land acquisition for agricultural development in Myanmar. It relies essentially on 
secondary sources, complementary interviews and field work conducted by the first author.  
We first established a genealogy of large-scale land acquisition processes relating to agricultural 
development. During the colonial period, the British introduced the problematic notion of waste 
land, arguing that it should be a prime target for agricultural investment. The post-independence 
nationalization of land and the establishment of State farms (and State-owned enterprises) were 
promoted until the military coup in 1988. At that time the military used the State lands to promote 
large-scale agricultural development in various ways, leading to the expropriation / displacement 
of existing users and smallholder farmers. The new Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Land Law, 
approved by the quasi-civilian government in 2012, offered the possibility of granting VFV land 
(waste land) to domestic and foreign investors. As such, this action should be seen in a longer 
historical trend of dispossession of smallholder farmers. 
Through this historical sequence, laws and institutions relevant to large-scale agricultural 
development have been interspersed. We identified nine different mechanisms through which the 
government has granted large-scale tracts of land for agricultural development. We showed the 
misalignment between official land categories and i) the on-the-ground reality, ii) the laws that 
shape the management of these categories, and iii) the institutions and authorities in charge of 
their management.  
From 1991 to October 2016, approximately 5.1 M acres of land were allocated to agro-business 
and individual entrepreneurs and to individual farmers if the area was less than 50 acres. The 
largest share of land – 2.2 M acres - was allocated by the previous Central Committee for 
Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Land Management (CCVFVLM) (43 percent) and the military 
commanders (27 percent). The areas covered by land use permits for large-scale agricultural 
development were granted by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation 
(MoNREC), former chief ministers, authorized departments within the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock and Irrigation (MoALI), and the newly established CCVFVLM. These represent 21, 4, 3 
and 2 percent of the total, respectively. 
One specific dataset including the majority of these cases (78.4 percent) allows a more detailed 
look into large-scale land acquisition on VFV land. Geographically, land use permits for 
agricultural development on VFV land are distributed across the country but are concentrated in 
Kachin State, Sagaing, Tanintharyi and Shan Regions. This dataset reveals that most of the large
-scale schemes are a legacy of the military period as most of them were signed off between 2007 
and 2011. Despite a temporary stop from 2012 to 2014, the granting of land use permits on VFV 
land resumed from 2015 onwards. Permits for VFV land were granted for agricultural 
development to companies (54 percent) and private individuals (32 percent). Considering only 
companies, the main crops cultivated were oil palm, rubber, rice, oil seeds crops and maize. 
We found a robust inverse relationship between the areas of VFV land granted (including 
transactions smaller than 50 acres) and land use effectiveness (the percentage of land granted 
that is put under effective cultivation). Clearly, smallholder farmers are more efficient than large-
scale entrepreneurs and companies in developing the VFV land granted. 
In addition to the large-scale land acquisition processes, there are a variety of contract farming 
mechanisms that allow investors certain forms  of control on land for agricultural development.    
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 These arrangements do not represent cases of large-scale land acquisition but rather forms of 
control on land and markets that can, all the same, have the effect of large-sale dispossession. 
A central concern is the number of evictions and conflicts pitting smallholder farmers against 
other actors such as companies, individual investors or ministries. This is because the land 
granted to these actors was often under active use by local farmers and villagers. Even if in most 
cases these farmers used the land merely to sustain their livelihoods, the legal apparatus of the 
land administration identified them as illegal occupants of State land.  
The previous and new governments have opened up a space for people to lodge complaints and 
claim their land rights. Under the previous government, a Parliamentary Commission was tasked 
to identify cases in which land had been unjustly confiscated. The Commission identified 489,369 
acres of confiscated land. It confirmed that the military was the main driver behind confiscations 
(51.5 percent), followed by industrialization projects (24.1 percent) and agricultural development 
(16.8 percent).  
This Commission operates under the auspices of a new government that is politically committed 
to solving conflicts and returning confiscated land to its original owners. The tasks of this new 
Central Reinvestigation Committee for Confiscated Farmlands and Other Lands are immense. It 
is supposed to address a multiplicity of problems, most of which can be traced back to a distant 
past. It is particularly difficult to return the land to the original owner of the land without depriving 
the existing tenants who have been using the land for a long time. It is also particularly difficult to 
differentiate between those who have opportunistically used idle (State) land to meet their 
livelihood needs and cases of speculative land grabs.  
Recommendations 
With the intent to inform a wider and multi-stakeholder dialogue on the issue of large-scale land 
acquisition for agricultural development, some key recommendations can be formulated in light of 
this study: 
Establish a moratorium on new large-scale land acquisition in order to conduct a 
comprehensive evaluation of large-scale agricultural development schemes; cancel land use 
permits when companies or entrepreneurs do not meet their contractual obligations; establish a 
clear instruction to determine responsibilities and mechanisms to re-allocate cancelled land to 
farmers, State or third parties and discuss whether large-scale land acquisitions are to be 
considered to promote agricultural investment and development after the moratorium; and 
establish a sound procedure to identify and monitor agricultural large-scale land acquisition in 
ways that promote responsible agricultural investment, particularly inclusive of smallholder 
farmers 
Establish a unified land governance framework that could address unresolved gaps and 
overlaps and harmonize existing pieces of legislation (national land law); harmonize the 
mechanisms for granting Large-Scale Land Acquisitions (LSLAs) and revise the definition of land 
categories and the procedure to convert land categories. 
Improve the management of data relevant to large-scale agricultural land schemes: support a 
process to improve the collection, management and analysis of reliable data related to LSLA in 
order to inform day-to-day decision-making and policy-making and enable public access to data 
related to large-scale agricultural development schemes. 
v 
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 Introduction 
Myanmar is exceptional in terms of the diversity of its social-ecological system. Home to 51.4 
million people (Department of Population, 2017), the country includes 135 ethnic groups 
speaking 118 languages (Lewis, 2009), which leads to a wide ethno-linguistic diversity in 
proportion to the population as a whole.  
The agriculture sector plays a major role in Myanmar’s economy. It forms 32 percent of the GDP 
and employs 52.4 percent of the labour force (Department of Population, 2017). The basic social 
unit of agricultural production is the agricultural household, engaged in multiple farming, livestock 
rearing, and the collection of natural resources that form an essential part of their livelihood. 
Despite their importance, smallholder farmers are often marginalized in decision-making 
processes that affect the development of agriculture in the country.  
Throughout the history of Myanmar, from the colonial era to the present, land has been used and 
controlled by a variety of government bodies, military factions and private corporations for 
numerous purposes: agro-industrial development; hydropower dams; extractive mining 
industries; urbanization; military projects, and so on (Ferguson, 2014). These projects have 
usually failed to take into account the reality of local populations who were in fact already using 
this land for their daily livelihoods. This has sparked institutional, economic and social tensions 
that have jeopardized the rights to land and the livelihoods of smallholder farmers across the 
country (ALTSEAN, 2014). 
None of the previous governments managed to establish a unified land governance framework in 
order to address these issues. As a result, the institutional pluralism and weak inter-sectorial 
coordination that currently prevails in approving, managing and monitoring land transactions, is a 
legacy from the past (Srinivas and Hlaing, 2015; Mark, 2016). 
Large-scale land acquisitions driven by agro-industrial lobbies and companies – usually in the 
form of land use permits signed between the State and a company – have been central in the 
recent rush for land in Myanmar: as in other countries in the Mekong Region, this trend gained 
momentum during the food and financial crisis of 2007-2008 that saw a convergence of State and 
company interests in investing in land resources.  
For a number of reasons linked to the particular history of Myanmar, but also due to misleading 
assumptions relating to the large-scale development model, the process of large-scale 
agricultural land development has been controversial. The acquisition and development of land 
has resulted in numerous negative impacts that have affected the development of smallholder 
farmers, who represent the large majority of the population, and who are an economic force in 
the country. 
The literature that documents the issues mainly consists of case studies, which provide key 
insights into particular cases but often fail to identify the main patterns and trends at country 
level. To fill such gaps, this thematic study aims to present an updated synthesis of the 
genealogy, institutional complexity and the ins and outs of large-scale land acquisition processes 
for agricultural development in Myanmar. Specifically, this thematic study aims to: i) understand 
the historical evolution of large-scale land acquisition in Myanmar; ii) examine institutional 
pluralism that governs agro-industrial land transactions nowadays; iii) provide an update in 
respect of agro-industrial land transactions as of 2017; iv) examine the extent to which LSLA has 
ignited land conflicts across the country; and v) present recommendations for the current and 
future management of large-scale land acquisition processes in Myanmar. 
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 The structure of the report follows the sequence of these objectives. After a brief methodology 
section, Chapter 1 presents the historical background for contemporary land transactions. It starts 
with a brief sketch of land history in Myanmar to present the successive political contexts in which 
agricultural land acquisition processes are situated, from the colonial period to the present. This 
Chapter argues that legacies from the distant and more recent past still linger. Chapter 2 
presents the current institutional framework governing large-scale land acquisition processes in 
Myanmar. It reviews how the legal framework links with different land categories and statutory 
authorities and examines the pathways mobilizing these institutions to grant large-scale land 
tracts for agricultural development. Chapter 3 examines the current situation of large-scale 
agricultural land use permits in Myanmar. It provides first an aggregate picture of land use 
permits granted for different land categories. It then reviews in more detail the situation of land 
use permits for Vacant, Fallow and Virgin (VFV) land - the evolution over time of land granted, the 
recipients, intended use, spatial distribution, land use effectiveness and the profile of key 
investors. Chapter 4 looks at conflicts associated with large-scale land acquisition for agricultural 
development and discusses the circumstances in which land claims are made by smallholder 
farmers. Ultimately, the study presents different recommendations to improve the governance of 
LSLA transactions in Myanmar.  
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 Methods and Data Sources 
In order to draw a countrywide picture of large-scale land acquisition, access to comprehensive 
data is crucial. This thematic study relies on information from a variety of sources. 
The first author has conducted a significant number of field surveys over the last nine years 
across Myanmar. These surveys were not designed for the purpose of this study but have been 
subsequently consolidated to provide evidence and to inform its conclusions. The information 
emanating from these different surveys was also used in the current report to make case studies 
that illustrate specific aspects of the analysis. 
The legal framework analysis is entirely based on a review of original legal documents compiled 
in Leckie, S., & Simperingham, E. (2009). Housing, Land and Property Rights in Burma: the 
current legal framework. Legal documents released after 2009 were accessed on the MyLaff 
portal (http://mylaff.org/) hosted by the Land Core Group.  
Data on large-scale agricultural land transactions was primarily collected at the Department of 
Agricultural Land Management and Statistics (DALMS) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock 
and Irrigation (MoALI) as well as from the Forest Department of the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Environmental Conservation (MoNREC). This data, aggregated at national level, provided 
information about the evolution of land transactions signed with, and the crops that were planted 
by, agro-business companies. The dataset was processed and analysed to identify the 
magnitude of large-scale land acquisition in Myanmar (DALMS 2017b and Forest Department, 
2013). Additionally, a particularly detailed dataset of land transactions on Vacant, Fallow and 
Virgin lands - probably the most up-to-date source of information currently available on LSLA in 
Myanmar - serves as the main data source for statistical and spatial analyses (DALMS, 2017a)). 
The dataset provides an inventory of all transactions on VFV land from 1991 to 2016 including 
recipients, granting authority, location down to Village Tracts, area sizes granted and planted, 
and intended land use, though this later information is not well recorded and does not support a 
proper analysis. The dataset was cleaned and values of key indicators were grouped into specific 
categories before analysis. The analysis of large-scale land acquisitions presented here is limited 
to VFV land transactions higher than 50 acres1. The choice of this threshold value is based on 
Article 10 of the VFV Land Law which allows rural farmers to acquire VFV land for an area not 
exceeding 50 acres. We have also excluded the area of VFV land that was converted into 
farmland under current VFV Land Law (13,363 acres). 
In the absence of a monitoring system for large-scale land transactions, it is difficult to conduct a 
meaningful and comprehensive analysis of their impact on smallholder farmers’ livelihoods, be it 
positive or negative. In addition to the case studies conducted by the first author, we consulted a 
number of research reports that were accessed through the MyLaff portal. The authors 
conducted additional expert interviews to shed light on particular legal issues that could not be 
addressed through legal documents alone. The publications of other international organizations 
(e.g. Namati) and reports from civil society organizations, such as the Myanmar Peace Alliance, 
have also been consulted. 
To complete the datasets, we also accessed information that The Daily Eleven Newspaper has 
dedicated to bringing land dispute cases to the attention of the public. Government newspapers 
were consulted to obtain the official information released by investigation commissions. 
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 We further consulted reports from the Investigation Commission for the Prevention of Public 
Disenfranchisements Connected to the Confiscation of Farmland and Other Lands, also known 
as the Parliamentary Land Investigation Commission2. The Commission has been assigned to 
examine cases considered to be land grabs and to propose solutions in respect of releasing land 
to its original owners. In most cases these are smallholder farming families (Republic of the Union 
of Myanmar, 2013b). We examined these reports and entered the information they contained into 
a database. A preliminary statistical and spatial analysis of this database was documented in a 
report released in 2015 (San Thein, Pyae Sone and Diepart, 2017). We reviewed the report of 
the investigation commission in Maubin State - authored by U Sein Win (2013) - as it was 
particularly well documented. 
To the extent that it was possible, we provided a geographical representation of the data and 
information analysed. The use of GIS was particularly informative in linking LSLA processes to 
land dispute cases. 
It should be mentioned that the statistical data that is disclosed in this report may not provide a 
full picture of the ground realities in respect of large-scale land transactions. It contains a series 
of flaws due to the incompleteness of some of the data and discrepancies between the legal land 
use categories and the actual use on the ground. For a start, many large-scale land transactions 
on VFV land may not have been reported in the database. However, it is probably the most 
significant and up-to-date dataset in respect of large-scale land acquisitions in Myanmar and is 
one of the first attempts to compile and analyse such data from government sources. 
Furthermore, the database related to large-scale land transactions on forest land is dated 2012 
and does not include transactions approved from 2013 onwards.  
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1. A Genealogy of Agricultural Land Acquisition 
Processes in Myanmar  
In this first Chapter, we aim to show the historical background and evolution of large-scale 
agricultural land acquisition processes by situating them in their specific political-economic 
contexts (see Figure 1 and detail in Annex 1). 
Figure 1 - Milestones in the history of land in Myanmar.  
Source: authors 
  
1.1 Myanmar land history at a glance 
In the pre-colonial time, the people of the Kingdom of Myanmar acquired private land rights by 
clearing and cultivating (Da’’ma’-u-khja) land that was non-bonded to the crown, consisting of 
communal or ancestral lands (Bo’’bapaing). After payment of the relevant tax - tax per capita 
based on individual wealth (Furnivall, 1957; Boutry et al., 2017) - these lands became the 
property of the cultivator (u-paing ), which included the right to mortgage, sell or pass them to 
their descendants. Subsequently, possession rights (u-paing) have been registered in an I-A form 
(land use record) by the Settlements and Land Records Department (SLRD). 
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 From 1824 to 1948, the British ruled the country in a liberal fashion with much focus on rice 
growing regions. Under colonial rule, ‘land holders’ rights’ (see Figure 2) were granted to  those 
who cleared land, cultivated it, and who had been paying land revenue continuously for 12 years. 
The occupant had the right to transfer or sell the land under this title. In the upland regions, 
however, land considered to be empty or vacant - so-called ‘waste land’ in the British terminology 
- could be appropriated by the State for rubber and other crops grown on colonial estates or for 
colonial forestry projects (Scurrah, Hirsch and Woods, 2015).  
In an attempt to regain control over large plantations established by the British and to reduce 
landlordism and the over-indebtedness of peasants, in 1953 the post-government (1948-1962) 
enacted the Land Nationalization Act. This Act conferred to the State the ownership of land in the 
whole of the Union of Burma. Large colonial estates (rubber and others) were nationalized and 
run as State-owned enterprises. Land was also subject to a form of agrarian reform targeting 
peasants and poor farmers. The land redistribution under the Land Nationalization Act was poorly 
implemented and many lands ended up in the hands of better-off farmers (Taylor, 2009). It 
quickly turned into a spontaneous ‘land to the tiller’ (see Figure 2) approach, providing land rights 
to those who cultivated it but prohibiting the sale or mortgage of that land.  
In 1962, the coup d’état against the government led to a totalitarian socialist regime. However, it 
did not fundamentally affect the rules relating to land rights. The Burmese Way to Socialism 
programme (and Party) was established and a State-led socialist economic system adopted, first 
under a revolutionary council (1962-1974) and then under the Socialist Republic of the Union of 
Burma. The State (1974 to 1988) took centre stage in all aspects of land management. A series 
of laws were passed with a view to protecting smallholder farmers. Large-scale waste lands were 
developed to establish State farms and agro-industries. But the failure of the State-led socialist 
economy over nearly three decades reduced Myanmar to ‘least-developed country’ status. 
In 1988, economic disaster and political oppression ignited a pro-democracy uprising movement 
throughout the country. The nationwide upheaval and public protests were repressed by military 
force. The military took over the country and adopted the command economy under a regime 
known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) from 1988 to 1997, and then 
under the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) from 1997 to 2011. Smallholder 
farmers continued to enjoy ‘land to the tiller’ rights that were non-transferable and formalized 
through land tax receipts and farmers’ booklets. These rights did not provide farmers with the 
opportunity to choose the crops they wanted to cultivate (see Figure 2). Up to 2003, land rights - 
particularly for paddy lands - were also linked to a compulsory quota of production to be provided 
to the government at low prices. Failure to comply with such a quota would result in confiscation 
or more commonly in dispossession through concealed distress land sales. 
Following the 1988 uprisings, the country’s economy was gradually opened. This led to a series 
of measures such as the liberalization of the paddy market and the promotion of private 
investments including the opening of opportunities for foreign investors. In 1991, the military 
government formed and prescribed the duties of the Central Committee for the Management of 
Cultivable Land, Fallow Land and Waste Land, also known as the ‘Waste Land Instruction’ and 
the ‘Procedures conferring the right to cultivate land/ right to utilize land’3. The Committee was 
empowered to scrutinize and grant domestic companies - but also increasingly foreign ones - and 
private citizens the right to use cultural l land fallow and waste land for agricultural business 
(including livestock and aquaculture) for an initial period of 30 years renewable 10 years at a time 
up to a total of 50 years. A large number of land confiscations and widespread expropriation 
occurred during this period throughout the country due to the following causes: i) collusion 
between influential economic actors and the military which thus resulted in the abuse of power; ii) 
non-compliance by the respective authorities with the prevailing Land Acquisition Act and other 
laws; and iii)  many smallholder production systems such as shifting cultivation, rotating agriculture,  
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 and several forms of agro-forestry operated under customary tenure regimes, which were not 
recognized and consequently considered as VFV land and subject to legal acquisition. As a 
result, a large number of land confiscations and widespread expropriation occurred during this 
period throughout the country. 
In 2011, a democratic transition began. But in the land sector, the logic remained much the same: 
the government’s main aim was still to attract domestic and foreign actors to invest in land and 
agro-industrial development (but also to promote other forms of large-scale investment in, for 
example, mineral concessions, hydroelectricity projects, and so on). The legislation instituted in 
2012 through the VFV Land Management Law aimed primarily to foster large-scale agricultural 
investment (Oberndorf, 2012). Furthermore, the 2012 Farmland Law provided smallholders with 
‘Rights to farm’ that were transferable and formalized through a land use certificate, also known 
as ‘form 7’. These rights to farm finally authorized farmers to sell, mortgage or rent their lands but 
still did not formally provide farmers with the full capacity to choose the crops they cultivate (see 
Figure 2). On VFV land the legislation allowed the government to grant ‘Land use permits’ for 
commercial agriculture and livestock breeding to domestic or foreign companies, individual 
entrepreneurs or family-sized cultivators who could acquire a maximum of 50 acres of VFV land. 
These land use permits were formalized through different forms (#11 to 15) depending on the 
actual use of the VFV land, but, in theory, they could not be sold, mortgaged, given or 
transferred. However, they did impose a requirement to pay tax to the State. As such, the new 
laws were a continuity of past provisions and failed to establish a unified land governance 
framework that could help to address contradictions and issues inherited from the past. However, 
the government became more responsive to the social and political impacts of expropriation and, 
in a speech in 2012, the President Thein Sein even pledged to return confiscated lands. This led 
to the establishment of a parliamentary commission on land investigation tasked to scrutinize 
cases of land confiscation and to recommend ways to return land to previous owners. 
In March 2016, a new government was elected and ‘land issues’ were one its priorities (NLD 
2015). The efforts of the previous parliamentary commission of land investigation (now 
dissolved), focusing on the return of land, are now being pursued by the Central Reinvestigation 
Committee for Confiscated Farmlands and Other Lands (Myae Sit), which was established on 9 
June 2016.  
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 1.2 Colonial legacy in contemporary agricultural plantations 
British attempts to manage and control land in Myanmar were concentrated in the lowland rice 
growing area where they were operationalized through tax collection. With over 7 MT of rice 
exports, the economic profits at stake were far from negligible (Turnell cited in Scurrah et al., 
2015).  
But in the uplands, land tenure management mainly aimed to secure properties and estates for 
the British colonialists and local elites. It also aimed to attract a class of European investors who 
could inject capital into crop plantations such as sugarcane, indigo, and so on. 
Large-scale land acquisition was permitted through legislation enacted in the 19th century that is 
still valid in Myanmar today. The 1894 Land Acquisition Act introduced the possibility for the State 
to allocate so-called waste land and arable land if it was for ‘public purposes’. The lack of 
definition for ‘public purposes’ and the fuzzy distinction between public and private interests 
persist to this day:  
….. whenever it appears to the President of the Union that the temporary occupation and 
use of any waste or arable land is needed for any public purpose, or for a company, the 
President of the Union may direct the Collector to procure the occupation and use of the 
same for such term as the President of the Union shall think fit, not exceeding three years 
from the commencement of such occupation (Article 35(1) in the Land Acquisition Act, 
1894) 
‘Waste land’ actually refers to a category established by the British colonial administration in the 
1861 Rules for the Grant of Waste Land; this is the first piece of legislation to establish 
agricultural plantations on land under lease arrangements. Since the release of this rule more 
than 150 years ago, the category of `waste land’ has been a central element of land management 
in Myanmar, particularly with respect to large-scale agricultural land transactions. 
There were more than 114 land grants under the British occupation. Annexes 2 and 3 provide the 
chronology of sugarcane and rubber plantations initiated in the colonial period.  
1.3 Development and transformation of State-owned economic 
enterprises (SEEs) from the socialist era to the military regime 
In this section we aim to show how the land sector was reshaped after the country gained 
independence. We look at the different mechanisms through which the military has assumed 
increasing responsibilities in managing large-scale agricultural land transactions. 
1.3.1 Rationales for the establishment of SEEs 
Following independence in 1948, the new government released the Land Nationalization Act in 
1953 in a move to take farmland from absentee landlords and redistribute it to peasants and poor 
farmers. The Land Nationalization Act also allowed the socialist government to nationalize the 
existing large natural rubber plantations run by private companies during the British colonial time. 
Those plantations were placed under the Ministry of Agriculture and Forest4 (MoAF) as State 
farms (i.e. State-owned rubber estates).  
State farms were established during the socialist era and continued throughout SLORC/SPDC 
rule until the present day. The rationale for their establishment was manifold.  
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 First, they were a way for MoAF to expand export-oriented mechanized production to meet the 
target production figure for State-owned enterprises. But since early times, MoAF had also 
established large State farms in undeveloped localities to manage the resettlement of 
demobilized soldiers returning from the battle fields, as well as internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) in conflict areas, e.g. in Shan State. At some points, the government even received 
technical assistance to do so. For example, it was supported by USAID around 1982 for maize 
and oil seed projects undertaken by the Agriculture Corporation (a State enterprise) of MoAF 
(see Table 1, Serial Numbers 2 and 3). Around 1980, under a directive from the Deputy Minister 
of MoAF, the Agriculture Corporation developed deforested land covering about 5,000 acres (the 
Kyu Taw Reserved Forest Area in Kanbulu Township). This is known as the Myae Mon estate 
(see Table 1 Serial Number 7). 
The policy objectives of MoAF under the military rule were to: (i) increase rice production to 
ensure food security and export earnings; (ii) ensure self-sufficiency in edible oil; and (iii) promote 
industrial crops such as cotton, rubber, sugarcane and jute. The policy push for the development 
of industrial crop production and enterprises contributed to the considerable expansion of agro-
industrial farmland into so-called waste land, farmlands or forest lands. 
However, the rationale behind the adoption of State farms and State-owned Economic 
Enterprises (SEE) differed clearly between the actors of the socialist era (1962-1988) and the 
military regime (1988-2011). The Burma Socialist Programme and Party (1962-1988) promoted 
the development of State farms and State enterprises to meet the targets of the socialist planned 
economy. Under the military regime (1988-2011), the land tenure system for smallholder farmers 
was not formally transformed and the compulsory rice quota system was maintained until 2003. 
However, the military actively used SEEs as a tool to enhance its own economic wealth. In its 
early rule, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) expanded the ministries in both 
size and number to carry out State-led production and State-monopoly exports. It transformed the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry into the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MoAI) by 
establishing and expanding five large enterprises focusing on industrial crops, and promoted the 
role of large farms to increase exportable crops (see Table 1, serial number 1 and 5). All agro-
industrial factories were transferred from the Ministry of Industry to MoAI, which also oversaw 
new factories for sugar, rubber, textiles, jute and fibre, and canning products.  
1.3.2 The strengthening of the military’s economic power through the expansion of the 
military’s commercial entities (MEHL and MEC).  
In March 1989, the military government enacted the State-owned Economic Enterprises Law 
allowing any government organization to establish commercial enterprises. This law also enabled 
any private organization to undertake commercial activity, except in respect of 12 sectors (teak, 
petroleum, jade and minerals, banking and insurance, broadcasting, the production of arms, air 
and rail transport, post and telecommunications) for which government participation was 
mandatory, at least in the form of a joint venture with the private companies. The law was 
amended in 1997 to allow government employees to run commercial enterprises with their own 
paid-up capital and without government funding. These laws were passed as the foundation for 
the military regime to establish two military-based commercial enterprises: Myanmar Economic 
Corporation (MEC) and Myanmar Economic Holding Co. Ltd. (MEHL). 
Both of these military commercial entities grew in size over a short period by establishing their 
own commercial entities and industries. To do so, they took over factories and State farms that 
used to be operated by the line ministries. The transition was abrupt as the owner-ministry (the 
MoAI in most cases) was generally ordered with only a half–day’s advance notice to transfer 
selected successful factories to the Ministry of Defence which in turn delivered these to MEC and 
MEHL. When MEC established its own factories, it took land from the nearby areas of cultivated 
or fallow land that was operated either by the State enterprise or by local farmers.  













1.3.3 Rapid expansion of military battalions throughout the country (SLORC, after 1988) 
The military regiments and 
battalions were extended 
throughout the country, and, in 
most areas where military camps 
were extended, land grabs (driven 
by individual and corporate 
interests on the part of the military) 
became a common practice.5 It 
appeared that the military took over 
the lands suited to crop production 
in order to support soldiers’ 
livelihoods but also to support the 
army, as exemplified in the textbox 
shown here. 
By the end of March 2004, the 
Chief of the State in a cabinet 
meeting ordered all the battalions 
and army camps to stop conducting 
commercial business for the 
purposes of battalion welfare. 
However, they were allowed to 
continue with commercial activities 
that were agriculture-based. 
A case of agricultural land confiscation by the military and MEC 
At the end of the socialist era, the shortfall in sugar production by SEE factories 
caused a rapid rise in the domestic sugar price. Many small-scale private sugar 
processors started operating in Mandalay. Driven by the demand from these 
processors, farmers in Kanbulu Township and upper areas of Sagaing Region cleared 
the forest and VFV land during the 1980s and grew sugarcane, processed syrup and 
sent it to the Mandalay processors via Ayeyawaddy river channels. The lucrative sugar 
business encouraged local farmers to turn deforested land into sugarcane plantations. 
In this context, around 2000, the State commercial farm (Myae Mon estate) in Kanbalu 
Township was taken over by the military and the Kanbalu sugar factory was 
established by MEC. The MEC sugar factory came to this area which was already 
cultivated and took over the land, including: (i) more than 3000 acres of the Myae Mon 
(Agricorp) SEE estate; (ii) farmers’ cultivated lands on VFV land; and (iii) the farms of 
local people (mainly planted with sugarcane) that had been relocated by SEEs on the 
western side of Myae Mon estate. The nearby farms operated by local farmers were 
also taken during a later expansion of the factory sugarcane area. In the cases of land 
on which rubber, cotton and coffee were being cultivated, a similar confiscation of 
large State farms or local peoples’ lands used for cultivation was carried out by the 
military commercial groups of MEC or MEHL. 
A case of military implications in agricultural land 
grabbing 
During the socialist government, the Township Survey and 
Land Records Department (SLRD) surveyed an area in Daw 
Ka Lo Khu Village, Ngwe Taung Village Tract, De Maw Soe 
Township, Kayah State. The SLRD made kwin and cadastral 
maps indicating lands used by villagers. In 1982, despite this 
official registration, an infantry battalion confiscated 76 acres 
of paddy land belonging to13 households. No compensation 
was given even if these lands held by farmers were registered 
(U Paing). 
During the initial three to four years after land confiscation, the 
military grew paddy on lands using villagers as forced labour to 
carry out ploughing, transplanting and paddy cultivation. Later 
the military leased lands to villagers with a rent fixed at six 
baskets of paddy per acre or the equivalent in cash. The land 
leases were allocated to farmers from other villages rather 
than to the original owners from Daw Ka Lo Khu. 
A Genealogy of Agricultural Land Acquisition  
11 
 1.4 The 1991 Waste Land Instructions 
In 1991, SLORC released two instructions named ‘Prescribing Duties and Rights of the Central 
Committee for the Management of Culturable [sic] Land, Fallow Land and Waste Land’ also 
known as the ‘Waste Land Instruction’ and ‘Procedures conferring the right to cultivate land/ right 
to utilize land’. The first defined the duties and rights of the Central Committee for the 
Management of Culturable Land, Fallow Land and Waste Land (previously known as the Central 
Committee for VFV Land Management - CCVFVLM). This committee was to be responsible for 
scrutinizing applications from State-owned economic enterprises and cooperative societies, joint-
ventures, other organizations and private individuals to obtain the rights to lease and 
commercially cultivate cultural land, fallow land and waste land (VFV land) for the purposes of 
carrying out agriculture, livestock breeding, aquaculture enterprises or other affiliated economic 
development enterprises. These instructions related to land lease agreements that covered a 
maximum of 5,000 acres and a period not exceeding 30 years. 
The 1991 Waste Land instructions became a key instrument in promoting large-scale agricultural 
development in Myanmar. According to statistics from the Survey and Land Records Department 
(SLRD, now called the Department of Agricultural Land Management and Statistics - DALMS), 
between 1991 and 1995, 946 applications covering 148,927 acres were granted by the Central 
Committee. By 2010, according to the same authorities, the area of VFV land granted to agro-
business companies for agro-industrial production had increased more than twelvefold to reach 
1,894,555 acres (DALMS, 2017b). 
1.5 The military government’s quick steps for agricultural development  
Four years after the military government seized power, the top leaders considered that large 
tracts of land resources remained unexploited and, if left in the hands of local farmers, these 
would never be exploited and agricultural development would not occur. Due to the Western 
sanctions imposed upon them, the military government relied on the country’s internal strength, 
i.e. the local private companies (mostly construction companies) involved in supporting the 
government’s nation-building projects.  
The first project was the granting of a delta floodplain (in the delta region) to agro-business 
companies (ABCs) for land reclamation in Ayeyarwady and Yangon Regions. The project, also 
known as ‘Tapping the Under-Water Treasures’, aimed to boost paddy cultivation. As of 
February 1999, a total of 231,949 acres in the Ayeyarwady and Yangon Regions had been 
granted to 24 business groups (The Mirror, 1999, see Annex 4) but the area of land granted 
continued to expand after this period. 
In addition to paddy cultivation, the military government launched a campaign to promote national 
self-sufficiency in edible oil. Myanmar people consume considerable quantities of edible oil and 
the production of cooking oil from sesame and groundnut could not meet the domestic need. 
Thus, Myanmar needed to import about 250,000 to 300,000 MT of palm oil at a cost of about 
USD 350 million a year. In order to substitute these imports and promote regional development in 
the south of the country, SLORC extended palm oil plantations in Tanintharyi Region. Under the 
motto ‘Tanintharyi Region shall become an edible oil bowl’, more than 40 domestic 
companies were granted a total land area of 1,648,731 acres for palm oil plantations (Annex 5), 
with a land area per concession varying from 200 acres to 514,169 acres.  
Around 2004-2005, a jatropha initiative was launched by the Senior General Than Shwe 
throughout the country. The details of the top-down order were disseminated to every corner of 
the country to force each Region and State to plant jatropha (Jatropha carcus) on 500,000 acres 
per Region, regardless of the actual size of the State/Region.   
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 The target was that 8.5 million acres of the whole country would be under jatropha cultivation 
within three years. Authorities in each Region and State of the country had to identify 500,000 
acres to meet the quota imposed by the General Administration Department (GAD) of the 
Ministry of Home Affairs, a civilian administration under military control. The quota in respect of 
the area to be assigned to jatropha cultivation was sanctioned by the local authority so that 
jatropha was actually planted anywhere possible - on VFV land, at the road side, farm borders 
and all other available lands. After two years, a report indicated that 1.86 million acres of jatropha 
had been planted. Myanmar’s dramatic achievement took all surrounding countries by surprise, 
but nobody knew that local farmers’ fields had been grabbed to reach this milestone. During the 
quasi–civilian government headed by U Thein Sein, the jatropha scheme was not officially 
terminated. As the necessary infrastructure for collection, market and oil extraction was never 
built and due to its low profitability and the many land conflicts it had generated, jatropha 
plantations (at least those that were planted) silently disappeared without any official authority 
involvement or specific instructions.  
Under the ‘One month – one dam’ initiative, one of the senior generals mandated his cabinet to 
expand the irrigated lands throughout the country by building one dam every month. This has 
been another significant cause of deforestation across the main watershed area. Several villages 
located within the dam reservoir area were displaced. Even if these dams were small in size, their 
accumulated impact was considerable, involving the loss of farmlands6 and livelihood 
opportunities, as well as the disturbance of children’s education, the loss of habitats for wildlife, 
environmental degradation, and so on, as exemplified in the text box below. The problems were 
not made public during military rule but have since come to light (based on the first author’s 
experience in the area).  
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Impact of the relocation scheme on smallholder farmers displaced by the dams 
A case in Sagaing Region shows how military officers handled the relocation of farmers who were 
displaced by the construction of dams, and the domino effects resulting in land conflicts involving 
different categories of farmers. 
The construction of two large dams (Tha Phan Seik dam and Kin Dat dam) led to the relocation of 71 
villages (see the Table below). 
Table: Displacement of villages and households from the construction sites of the Kin Dat and Thaphan 
Seik dams, Sagaing Region, 1996 
Source: Village relocation scheme and land development project report, MoAI, 1996 
There was a total farmland area of 41,687 acres in the two projected reservoir sites. As compensation, 
the relocated villagers were given 13,349 acres of vacant lands in nearby places. Clearly, the relocation 
area was not sufficient for all 7,707 displaced households. The relocation was conducted hastily without a 
proper feasibility study and led to three types of competing claims among the villagers for the use of the 
land. 
1. Farmers from displaced villages were relocated inside the Thit Yar Pin reserve forest. But the area was 
already occupied by other original farmers who refused to surrender the land. The authorities removed 
them forcibly arguing that they had illegally occupied the forest land. 
2. These secondary displaced farmers searched for new forestland (Taw Kyan) to clear for cultivation 
and pursued their traditional “Da’’ma’-u-khja” livelihoods. However, their land rights in these new 
locations were not recognized as forest officials denied de-gazetting the area. 
3. In one of the two areas relating to the dams, before the construction work was completed the would-be 
displaced villagers stayed to cultivate their farms located in the future reservoir area. Two years later, 
when the construction was completed, the villagers went to the areas assigned to them as compensation. 
When they arrived, they found that their plots were already occupied by local people who claimed that 
they were “leshi-le-ngoke” (farmers holding land in their possession and performing cultivation). Conflict 
arose and finally the “dam-displaced” villagers lost the land. With their cattle and household items, the 
villagers became landless and wandered from one place to another looking for other land to settle on and 
cultivate. When asked what they needed, they said that they were expecting the government to do 
something to help them. But this problem remains unresolved. 
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To highlight the significant legacy of the military period in terms of contemporary land conflicts, 
the following Table (1) presents a few examples of agro-industrial State enterprises that were es-
tablished during this socialist-military period and that have initiated land encroachment and con-









No. of people 
relocated 
Kyun Hla for Kin Dat dam 2 8 808 4,843 
Tant Se 1 2 438 2,531 
Kanbalu 2 3 231 1,081 
Kyun Hla for Thaphan Seik dam 15 58 6,228 33,232 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 1.6 Transformations since 2011 
The nationwide election held on 7 November 2010 in accordance with the new Constitution, 
which was approved in a referendum held in 2008, brought to power the military-supported Union 
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). In 2011, some former generals became new high-
level civil servants (Chief Minister of State, Union Minister, and President) and retained a 
considerable amount of power. State power was divided into executive and legislative bodies, but 
the chief of the army was placed out of the control of the President, government, courts and 
jurisdiction. The ministers and senior figures of the Ministry of Home Affairs are appointed by the 
army (and not by the President) but have authority over the General Administration Department 
(GAD), a civilian administration of this ministry comprised mainly of civilian staff.  
After decades of strict rule, the hope of democracy that emerged from this transition incentivized 
farmers to claim their rights to land, in particular those whose land had been expropriated. 
Without any consultation with each other, farmers across the whole country protested, rallied and 
submitted their complaints to the then President, the Parliament - Lower House (Pyithu Hluttaw) 
and Upper House (Amyotha Hluttaw) - and the opposition party National League for Democracy 
(NLD). Many activists and civil society networks encouraged and supported farmers’ protests 
(Boutry et al. 2017). In fact, protests were notably triggered by the expectations created by U 
Thein Sein’s speech on the return of confiscated lands, in the midst of the land registration 
process.  
In 2012, the release of the Farmland Law officially liberalized land transactions and the 
development of a land market in the country. The land tiller rights of the previous Land Law 
became a right to farm, which provided an entitled land user with the right to sell, pawn, lease, 
exchange or give, in whole or in part, the land in accordance with prescribed regulations. 
Through the 2012 law, farmland became a commodity and, in the context of the 2008 food crisis, 
also a target for investment. The commodification of land in the market, even if it pre-dates the 
release of the Farmland Law, drove land speculators of various types - companies, city dwellers 
and businessmen - to buy farmland particularly along the road sides. 
The 2012 VFV Land Law, which now serves as the main legal avenue for the allocation of State 
land for agricultural development, is a continuation of the 1861 Rules for the Grant of Waste Land 
and the 1991 Waste Land Instructions. The VFV Land Law renews the formation of a Central 
Committee for the Management of Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Land, with the minister of MoAI 
appointed as chairman, and the general director of SLRD as secretary. The VFV Committee is 
tasked with receiving and scrutinizing applications from public citizens, private sector investors, 
farmers, government entities and NGOs for the long-term land lease of VFV lands for commercial 
agriculture, livestock breeding, mining and other purposes. But unlike farmland, VFV land cannot 
theoretically be mortgaged, sold, sub-leased, divided or otherwise transferred without the 
approval of the government. In reality, however, much VFV land has been sold by grantees.  
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 2. Institutional Framework Governing Large-Scale Land 
Acquisition for Agricultural Development 
A historical review of land acquisition processes has revealed that large tracts of land for 
agricultural development were granted in the distant past by various authorities and through 
several mechanisms that continue to this day. 
2.1 Legal framework for large-scale agricultural land transactions 
The current legal framework that governs large-scale agricultural land transactions is a complex 
triad of laws, statutory authorities and land [use] categories dating back to the colonial era. These 
form the basis of what Oberndorf (2012) refers to as a statutory system of rural land 
classification.  
Unfortunately, there is no clear alignment between the land categories, the laws that shape the 
management of these categories, and the statutory authorities in charge of their management. 
The land literature on Myanmar consistently highlights areas of tension and mismatch between 
the elements of the triad, which create or exacerbate insecurity of tenure and land conflicts. The 
issues are made even more complex as the patron-client relationships articulated around those 
who hold State power have opened opportunities for the arbitrary application of land-related laws 
(Scurrah, Hirsch and Woods, 2015).  
2.1.1 Laws and regulations 
We now turn to the legal framework related to agricultural land transactions. The intention here is 
to provide a chronological overview of the relevant pieces of legislation and describe to what 
extent they are still relevant in respect of large-scale agricultural land transactions today (Table 
2).  
Table 2 – List of laws (and related rules) relevant to large-scale agricultural land 
transactions today 
 
1879 The (Lower Burma) Land and Revenue Act 
1889 The Upper Burma Land and Revenue Regulation 
1894 The Land Acquisition Act 
1899 The Lower Burma Towns and Villages Land Act 
1920-1951 
Yangon Development Trust Act and Department of Human Settlement and Housing De-
velopment. 
1962 The Village Headman Manual 
1987 The Transfer of Immoveable Property Restriction Act, 
1991 
The Duties and Rights of The Central Committee for the Management of Culturable 
Land, Fallow Land and Waste Land 
1992 The Forest Law 
2006 The Conservation of Water Resources and Rivers Law 
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 Source: authors 
 
The Land and Revenue Act, 1879 
 This document, which covered Lower Burma, defines landholder rights and prescribes 
their status, and the way he/she could acquire, abandon (relinquish) or recover his/her 
possession rights with respect to land. The document defines the President’s authority to 
allocate or cancel grazing land and regulates temporary occupation of the land. 
The Upper Burma Land and Revenue Regulation, 1889 
 This is an important piece of legislation that laid the foundation for the land-based taxation 
system and the collection of related forms of revenue. The notion of State land is defined 
as: i) land formerly termed royal land; ii) land held on condition of its holder rendering 
public service or emolument related to a public office; iii) islands and alluvial formations in 
rivers; iv) waste land and land included within reserved forests; and v) land that has been 
under cultivation but has been abandoned and to the ownership of which no claim is 
preferred within two years from the 13 July 1889. The text details the mechanisms for 
granting temporary occupation on waste land and allocation of such land for grazing 
activities.  
The Land Acquisition Act, 1894  
 This law sets a basis – that remains in force – for how a land can be taken by the State for 
business or other public purposes. It sets rules for preliminary investigation and 
publication for the intended acquisition of land, the hearing of objections, the declaration 
of intended acquisition, notices to persons interested, and inquiries into the measurement, 
values, claims and awards by collectors. Other rules cover the amount of compensation 
and its payment, the power entrusted to collectors, the acquisition of land for companies, 
and the publication of the agreement for a public notice. The delineation between 
business and other public purposes is blurry which is highly problematic nowadays when 
large-scale land allocations are significant. 
The Lower Burma Towns and Villages Land Act, 1899 
 This Act defines land at the disposal of the government and the modes of acquisition of 
landholders’ rights. The text specifies that the land at the disposal of the government may 
be disposed of by grant or lease. The general provisions with respect to landholders’ 
rights are detailed in this law, as well as those related to eviction from unauthorized 
possession and the use of State land 
 
2008 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar 
2012 Farmland Law and Rules 
2012 The Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Land Management Law 
2012 Protecting Rights and Enhancing Farmers’ Welfare Law 
2016 Myanmar Investment Law 
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 Yangon Development Trust Act, 1920 and 1951, Department of Human Settlement and Housing 
Development.  
 This Act authorizes, with the approval of the President, the confiscation of farmlands and 
waste lands for urbanization. 
The Village Headman Manual, 1962 
 This manual specifies the roles of the Village Headman who, among other responsibilities, 
has to prevent encroachment onto VFV land and take care of all land categories within the 
boundary of the village over which he has authority. The current Village Tract Chief Law 
prescribes the functions that are stated in the 1962 Village Headman Manual. 
The Transfer of Immoveable Property Restriction Act, 1987 (amended 2005) 
 This Act provides the legal basis for foreigners to acquire land under the Farmland Law 
and VFV Land Law. 
The Duties and Rights of The Central Committee for the Management of Culturable Land, Fallow 
Land and Waste Land, 1991 
 This instruction was the major legal basis for the military government’s action in terms of 
LSLA. It empowered the VFVL Central Committee to allocate VFV land to companies for 
commercial cultivation. The current VFV land committees continue to work under the 
guidance of this instruction. 
Procedures conferring the right to cultivate land/ right to utilize land, 1991  
 This instruction determines that the Central Committee for the Management of Culturable 
Land, Fallow Land and Waste Land may grant to citizens for agricultural and livestock 
breeding purposes the right to cultivate / right to utilize culturable land, fallow land and 
waste land for agriculture, plantation crops, orchards, seasonal crops, livestock, poultry 
farming, aquaculture, and so on. 
The Forest Law, 1992 
 This law frames the demarcation of areas for different types of forest that fall into the 
category of permanent forest estate (reserved forest, public protected forest and 
productive forest). The main implementing agency is the Forest Department. The Law 
allows for the re-classification of forest land into VFV land or, in the case of forest 
reserves, for de-gazetting this into an agricultural landholding or a public protected forest 
(Woods 2015). In both cases, it allows for large-scale agro-business operations. 
The Conservation of Water Resources and Rivers Law, 2006  
 The authority for waterfront boundaries, river creek boundaries, riverbank boundaries and 
alluvial islands is prescribed by the law to be the domain of the Ministry of Transport. But 
agriculture on alluvial islands is subject to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture. In 
the delta areas, some large-scale land schemes are subject to flooding, in which case the 
draining processes need to adhere to this law. Furthermore, some oxbow lakes have 
been reclaimed by agro-business companies for agricultural development, and they, too, 
have to comply with some of the provisions of this law. 
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 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008 
 This specifies that the State is the ultimate owner of the land and recognizes the market 
economy as the key mechanism for land transfer.  
Farmland Law and Rules, 2012 
 The Farmland Law (Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2012a) puts in place a system 
designed to secure the tenure of farmland through a land use certificate and registration 
system. In creating this system, the legislative branch of government created a private 
land use property right. Included in this land property right are the right to sell, the right to 
exchange, the right to access credit (i.e. to encumber the land with debt), the right to 
inherit, and the right to lease. The instruction of this law also prescribes the mechanisms 
for converting VFV land into farmland through the application for a permit by local farmers 
to secure a ‘Permission Order’ for the use of VFV land.  
The Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Land Management Law, 20127 
 The VFV Land Management Law (Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2012b), was a 
repackaging of the old Rules for the Grant of Waste Land (1861), and the 1991 Waste 
Land Instruction. It created a mechanism through which public citizens, private sector 
investors, farmers, government entities and NGOs could submit an application to the 
newly created CCVFVLM to lease VFV land for agricultural development, mining and 
other purposes allowed by law. The VFV Land Management Law allows the CCVFVLM to 
grant what can be considered as long-term leases on State land. VFV land that is leased 
may not be mortgaged, sold, sub-leased, divided or otherwise transferred without the 
approval of the government. It should be noted that this VFV law is in the process of 
revision 
Protecting Rights and Enhancing Farmers’ Welfare Law, 2012 
 This law was enacted in response to land grabbing and large-scale land acquisition by 
commercial companies. But it has little legal power compared with the Law Safeguarding 
Peasant Rights (1963), which was repealed by both 2012 Land Laws.  
Myanmar Investment Law, 2016 
 With a strong interest in promoting domestic - and attracting foreign - direct investment in 
land and natural resources, the newly released Law on Investment is an important 
element in the legal framework governing land and natural resources. The implementation 
of the law is conducted under the Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC) and in 
particular the Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA) that 
processes the permit and approval procedures. A full permit is required for certain 
businesses, i.e. those that are ‘strategic’, involving large amounts of capital, with a 
potential impact on the environment and local inhabitants that is significant, particularly if 
that impact involves ethnic minorities, or when the MIC decides that a permit is needed. A 
simpler ‘approval order’ is delivered by the MIC for any other investments.  
An investor who obtains a permit under the Investment Law has the right to obtain a long-term 
lease for the land or building from the owner if it is private land or building, or from the relevant 
government departments or government organization if that land is managed by the government  
(Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2016).  
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 The Notification No. 39/2011, issued by the cabinet of the previous government (published in the 
Myanmar gazette on 21 October 2011), states that the MIC will allow investors a lease on VFV 
land in accordance with permission granted by the VFV Central Committee. In the previous 
regulation, the initial lease period was to be 30 years. However, the 2016 Myanmar Investment 
Law allows 50 years with an additional two consecutive periods of 10 years. 
From an investor’s perspective, the new Law on Investment is definitely an improvement 
compared with its 2012 predecessor because: i) foreign and Myanmar investors are now covered 
by the same law; ii) the text is much clearer and the procedures to obtain permits have been 
simplified; and iii) the investment legislation is now aligned with international standards that 
favour investors (VDB, 2016). 
2.1.2 Land categories and statutory authority  
There are several different categories of land defined by the land administration system in the 
country. The statutory authority of respective departments varies in relation to different land 
categories. These categories are schematically classified into four main groups:  
- Agricultural lands including paddy / lowland (le), ‘dry’ upland (ya), alluvial island land (kaing 
kyun), garden land (u yin), uphill land under permanent or shifting cultivation (taungya), 
nipa palm land ( nipa), horticultural land and perennial crops land – all falling under the 
administration of DALMS. There is also specific water management infrastructure land 
(dams, reservoirs, embankments, and so on) under the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Irrigation, also under MoALI.  
- Forest land (Permanent Forest Estate) including reserved forest, protected public forest 
and forest in protected areas under the administration of the Forest Department 
(MoNREC).  
- Vacant, Fallow and Virgin land, sometimes referred to as Non-Permanent Forest Estate is 
under the administration of the Central Committee of Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Land 
Management.  
- Other lands comprising aquaculture land that falls under the Department of Fisheries 
(MoALI), mining land under the Department of Mining (MoNREC) as well as residential 
lands, village communal, grazing land and lands fall under the administration of the GAD. 
In fact the land categorization is quite problematic in Myanmar for at least four reasons: 
- The various classifications of land in the country are often poorly defined in the existing 
legal framework (Oberndorf, 2012);  
- Some land categories are not relevant. For example, there are unnecessary overlaps 
between farmland categories (for example, horticultural land, garden land, and ya land).  
- There are many old and conflicting laws relating to land classification and management in 
the country, which make the administration of land resources difficult and confusing for all 
stakeholders (Oberndorf, 2012);  
- There is a mismatch between how government maps categorize the land, how different 
Township offices administer the land, and the actual on-the-ground use of the land by local 
communities (Woods, 2015a). This stems from the lack of land resource inventories at 
District level and digitized GIS-based mapping. 
Among the highly diverse and partly overlapping land categories and corresponding authorities, 
six main categories are potential targets for large-scale agricultural investment (see Table 3). For 
each land category, the Table indicates the main governing authority and the main source of law 
guiding its governance. 
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 Table 3 - Statutory authority assigned to different government departments and ministries 
in accordance with different land categories 
Source: authors 
Legal land categories Statutory authority and main governing law 
Farmland 
Paddy / lowland (le), ‘dry’ upland (ya), alluvial is-
land land (kaing kyun), garden land (u yin), uphill 
land under permanent or shifting cultivation 
(taungya), nipa palm land (nipa), horticultural land 
and perennial crops land 
Farmland Administrative Body, MoALI 
 




Permanent Forest Estate 
Reserve forest, public protected for-
est, protected areas, private com-
mercial plantations 
Forest Department, Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Environmental Conservation 
  
Forest Law (1992) 
Central Committee for the Management of VFV 
Land, chaired by MoALI 
  
Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Land Law (2012) 
  
Vacant, Fallow and Virgin - 
VFV Land 




General Administration Department, Ministry of 
Home Affairs 
  
by Land and Revenue Act, 1879 
Leasable fisheries and aquaculture land 
Department of Fisheries, MoALI 
  
Freshwater Fishery Law, Aquaculture Law 
Mining land, gemstone land 
MoNREC (Ministry of Natural Resources and Envi-
ronmental Conservation) 
  
Myanmar Mines Act (At the VFV land stage, MoALI 
scrutinizes the case for the approval process. After 
being approved, the mining business is controlled by 
the Ministry of Resources and Environmental Con-
servation.) 
Urban/ Town land 
City Development Committees (Naypyitaw, Yangon, 
Mandalay), Ministry of Home Affairs 
  
Town and Village Act / City Development Committee 
Law 
Village land 
Ministry of Home Affairs 
 
Town and Village Act 




Village communal land 
Dams, reservoirs and embankments MoALI through the Channel Act 
Roads 
Ministry of Transport and Communication by the 
Roads Act 
Religious land/cemeteries, religious building lands Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs 
Riverbanks and waterfront boundaries and land 
underneath the rivers and creeks 
Ministry of Transport by the Conservation of Water 
Resources and Rivers Law 
Railways Ministry of Transport and Communication 
Airport fields Ditto by the Myanmar National Airways Law 
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 Farmland 
The categories of farmland include land designated according to a large variety of land uses: 
paddy / lowland (le), ‘dry’ upland (ya), alluvial island land (kaing kyun), garden land (u yin), uphill 
land under permanent or shifting cultivation (taungya), nipa palm land (nipa), horticultural land 
and perennial crops land. In fact, various land use categories under the `farmland’ banner were 
devised by the colonial government for the purpose of collecting revenues. Since earlier times, 
perennial crops land was designated for rubber land when the revenue from rubber plantations 
was high. But nowadays, the distinctions between land categories can be problematic in terms of 
recognizing land rights. In the case of alluvial island land (kaing kyun), for example, there are two 
types of alluvial land: unstable alluvial island emerging after floods recede; and stable alluvial 
land. Land use certificates (Form 7) can be issued in respect of the latter category but not for the 
former as unstable alluvial lands are considered State public land and thus cannot be owned by 
private entities. In reality, however, the boundary between the stable and unstable alluvial land is 
difficult to define. Another example relates to taungya land, defined by the Farmland Law, 2102, 
as shifting cultivation land with a rotational fallow system. DALMS classifies the taungya land into 
two categories: 1) stable settlement or permanent taungya; and 2) unstable and rotational 
taungya land. If the land is improved with terracing and permanent cultivation is established, it 
comes into the first category and is eligible for a land use certificate. However, the customary 
tenure right on so-called ‘unstable shifting cultivation’ is not formally recognized under the 2012 
Farmland Law. 
The Farmland Law (2012) attempts to put in place a system to secure rural land tenure through a 
land use certificate and registration system which encompass the full bundle of rights, i.e. access, 
usufruct, possession (holding) and alienation (right to sell, exchange and mortgage). Land Use 
Certificates recognizing rights granted are issued to farmers by the Farmland Administration 
Bodies (FABs), the newly established competent authority, and registered by the DALMS (known 
as SLRD before 2015), after payment of the required fees. 
Oberndorf (2012) notes that, in practice, however, even when farmers have legal land tenure 
documents, their land is still often appropriated by State or corporate interests, even if they have 
been cultivating and paying taxes on these lands for some time.  
The Farmland Administration Bodies (FAB) were created under the 2012 Farmland law. These 
committees - also called ‘land management committees’ (le see or mye see) - are composed of 
various representatives from MoALI (and DALMS) and GAD and exist from central level down to 
Village Tract level. At central level, they have the minister of the MoAI as chairperson, the deputy 
minister of MoAI as deputy chairperson and the director general of DALMS as secretary. This 
structure of FAB is replicated vertically to State / Region level and at both the District and 
Township level where the head of the General Administrative Department is the chairperson, and 
the head of DALMS is the secretary.  
Forestland: Permanent Forest Estate 
According the Forest Law (SLORC, 1992), the Permanent Forest Estate (PFE) includes three 
main categories of forest: reserved forest; protected public forest; and forest in protected areas.  
Reserved forest is ’reserved’ primarily for commercial logging in addition to wood supply for 
village use, watershed or catchment protection, environmental and bio-diversity conservation and 
other purposes.  
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 Protected public forests  (PPFs) are designated for the protection of water and soil, conservation 
of dry zone, mangrove forests, environment and bio-diversity as well as sustainable production. 
Woods (2015) suggests that commercial logging is also theoretically possible in PPFs. Protected 
areas constitute a category in which forest conservation is strictly enforced. It includes national 
parks and wildlife sanctuaries. 
The Forest Department under MoNREC (MoECaF before 2016) is the authority in charge of 
forestry. It retains full power to reclassify the category of the whole or a portion of a reserved 
forest. It can convert a reserved forest into a protected public forest, or decide that the whole, or 
a portion of the protected public forest that does not require conservation, will cease to be a 
protected public forest (Article 7, Forest Law 1992). The authors could not identify any 
regulations relating to the associated application process. 
Importantly, Article 13 of the Forest Law states that the Forest Department, with approval from 
MoNREC, can establish plantations on forest land that is part of a `permanent forest estate’. The 
law specifies that a plantation can be established for commercial, industrial, environmental 
conservation purposes or for the local supply of wood and firewood, and some other types of 
plantations are permitted. Additionally, Article 14 states that any person or any organization has 
the right to carry out in accordance with the stipulation, cultivation and maintenance of forest 
plantations with the exception of village owned firewood plantations cultivated by the villagers for 
their use. These Articles, in conjunction with Article 7, allows MoNREC to reclassify forest into 
different categories and grant agricultural plantation permits. However, no clear mechanism and 
procedure regulating how this is supposed to take place has been specified (Woods 2015a).For 
more details on the legal review of forest conversion and conversion timber, please refer to the 
work of K. Woods (2015a).  
VFV Land 
Virgin land falls into the category of `Vacant, Fallow and Virgin land’. If ‘virgin land’ refers to land 
that has never been cultivated (Article 2f of the 2012 VFV Land Law), ‘vacant and fallow land’ 
refers to land that used to be cultivated, but has since been abandoned (Article 2e of the 2012 
VFV Land Law).  
Virgin land includes any forest land where a classification of `reserved forest’ has not been 
conferred, or where protected areas or public protected forests have not been declared. It is a 
category by default. As such, it is a category by default. The jurisdictional management of virgin 
land areas (also known as public forest, uncategorized forest’, ‘woodland area’) is highly 
problematic because they fall under the provisions of the VFV Land Law (2012) but trees and 
forest are also subject to the forest law. 
The permanent tension in Myanmar in respect of this land category is linked to the fact that many 
areas of land that are under active cultivation by farmers, or that are used by community groups 
as part of a rotational swidden system, are considered as VFV land by the administration. In 
addition, many areas which are not serviced by DALMS may be considered as de facto VFV 
lands, despite the fact that farmers have lived and cultivated there for many decades. For the 
time being there are no provisions for issuing land use certificates in heterogeneous areas mixing 
shifting cultivation plots and fallow forest. Therefore, ethnic minorities who still practise this form 
of agriculture are at high risk of having their land confiscated as their customary tenure practices 
are not recognized in statutory law. But in fact the VFV Land Law does not differentiate between 
formal and informal land use, so swidden agriculture is actually invisible to the state 
administrators and maps.  
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 VFV lands are managed under the auspices of the Central Committee for the Management of 
VFV land (which is an inter-ministerial committee chaired by MoALI). CCVFVLM is a national 
level, multi-ministerial committee formed by the President in accordance with Article 3 of the VFV 
Land Law. The Chairperson of the CCVFVLM is the minister of MoALI and the director general of 
the DALMS (ex SLRD) acts as the secretary. The CCVFVLM oversees the granting and 
monitoring of user rights over VFV lands in the country for agriculture, mining and ‘allowable 
other purposes’ under the law, in coordination with relevant ministries and Regional or State 
governments. The main responsibilities of the CCVFVLM are to manage applications for the use 
of VFV land, to receive recommendations from various ministries and Regional or State 
governments and to receive applications for the use of VFV land from public citizens, private 
sector investors, government entities and NGOs.8  
The coordination role of the CCFVFLM is particularly important, involving MoNREC and other 
ministries, in order to prevent damage to forest lands and to conserve natural regions, watershed 
areas and natural fisheries. Of particular importance is the fact that degraded forest from the 
‘permanent forest estate’ can be reclassified as VFV land based on an agreement between 
MoALI and MoNREC.  
The role of the CCVFVLM is critical in this study as VFV land is the primary category of land 
granted to companies for agricultural development. 
Grazing Land 
The classification and management of grazing lands in Myanmar is set out in the Upper Burma 
Land Revenue Regulations (1889). In fact most legal grazing land has long been converted to 
other uses and is no longer used for grazing. Grazing land is not mentioned in the Farmland Law, 
but is specified in the VFV Land Law as one category of land that can be cancelled and 
converted into virgin land. Despite this unclear definition, grazing land is important for rearing 
livestock and is not just a degraded shrub area to be considered as idle.  
2.1.3 Land surveys, identification, monitoring and reclassification of land use categories 
Paper-based cadastral maps are used to generate land records and land use title information. In 
fact, cadastral mapping and surveying started when the British ruled India and Burma (Myanmar). 
With the exception of new settlement areas, almost all maps used to establish the national 
cadastre were developed by Indian surveyors at the end of the nineteenth century. Sincethen, 
updates and revisions to the maps have been minimal.  
Currently, however, DALMS – the Department of Agricultural Land Management and Statistics 
formerly known as SLRD - has been working with more advanced equipment (Total Station 
Theodolite, GIS software, and so on) despite important budget constraints (personal 
communication with the land officers). And perhaps unsurprisingly, the transition from paper-
based mapping to digital mapping has taken place slowly. From 2013 to 2015, UN-Habitat under 
the Land Administration and Management Programme (LAMP), supported DALMS, to use 
satellite imagery and GIS for updating cadastral maps in two Townships. UN-Habitat also 
developed a digital database system linking scanned register files to maps. However, this project 
was not taken over by DALMS and has not been extended to other Townships. Therefore, with 
century-old cadastral maps still in use today, the measurement of the natural boundaries, the size 
of the farm holdings (U Paing) and parcel boundaries are of dubious accuracy.  
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 The determination of the VFV land area 
is based on the so-called ‘one-inch’ 
map with a scale of approximately 
1/36,000. The Township and Village 
Tract surveyors have to work on such 
maps to identify VFV land areas 
precisely. The estimate of VFV land 
areas at the Village Tract level is then 
compiled and the corresponding figures 
for the Township level are calculated, 
then for the District, Region and State 
levels. It is, thus, not surprising that, as 
a result, different land use areas 
supposed to be adjacent on the map, 
actually overlap in reality. The 
demarcation of Land Use Certificates (form 7) faces similar problems, even though they are 
important in ensuring tenure security for millions of farmers. 
Another important role of sub-national authorities is to maintain up-to-date information about 
changes in land categories. One regional example (Yangon Region) is given in Figure 3 to 
illustrate evolutions in the different land categories between 1980-1981 and 2016-2017. This 
Figure indicates how areas of land categorized as town land, inland fisheries (including 











Figure 3 - Land conversion from VFV land to other land categories in 
Yangon Region between 1980-81 and 2016-17.  
Source: DALMS 
An example of the demarcation of VFV land 
concessions without prior verification on the ground 
In 1997, 19 agro-business companies (ABCs) received 
large-scale concessions for palm oil plantation in 
Tanantharyi Region. According to a testimony, all the 
company representatives gathered at the Maung Ma Kan 
beach resort in Dawei Township and the Senior General 
of SLORC assigned about 500,000 acres of land to each 
company, drawing them on a 1/36,000 map of Kawthaung 
and Boke Pyin Townships. This work was completed 
within one hour without any prior verification of the real 
situation on the ground. 
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 Often, land assessments are not systematically conducted with the result that the land use 
categories in the registry do not really correspond to the on-the-ground reality. A particular 
concern is the mismatch between the VFV land classification itself and the actual situation. Table 
4 shows, for instance, the distribution of VFV land in Regions and States and the area of VFV 
land left after the granting of land use permits to agro-business companies, according to DALMS 
data. It shows that, for the administration, there are still enormous areas considered by the 
government to be VFV land, whereas in reality, there appears to be little available VFV land. 
Indeed, 27 percent of the total land area of Myanmar is considered to be VFV land. This is highly 
problematic as VFV land is a prime target for large-scale land acquisition. It also shows that such 
government data needs to be manipulated carefully. Furthermore, Table 4 shows that in some 
Regions/States, land use permits were granted on large areas, sometime greater than the areas 
that were marked as VFV land (Yangon and Ayeyarwady). 
Table 4 - Extent of VFV land left available after large-scale land allocation by the State 
authorities of Myanmar by Region/State as of October 2016 
Source: DALMS, 2017b  
Note: Total VFV land area is the sum of virgin land and woodland. 




Total land area 
in acres 
Total VFVL in 
acres 
Total land 
granted as of 
October, 
2016* 
Extent of VFV land 
left available as of 
October 2016 
1 Naypyitaw 1,743,844 264,922 33,750 23,1173 
2 Kachin 22,002,702 9,427,649 1,386,281 8,041,368 
3 Kayah 2,898,920 453,827 0 453,827 
4 Kayin 7,507,743 3,101,374 35,034 3,066,340 
5 Chin 8,900,458 4,235,832 1,744 4,234,088 
6 Sagaing 23,154,382 4,361,067 602,753 3,758,314 
7 Tanintharyi 10,710,756 3,576,777 474,829 3,101,948 
8 Bago 9,737,554 370,772 203,298 167,474 
9 Magway 11,075,404 2,527,868 212,172 2,315,696 
10 Mandalay 7,632,611 665,600 58,170 607,430 
11 Mon 3,038,565 226,811 33,296 193,515 
12 Rakhaine 9,088,053 3,814,687 140,774 3,673,913 
13 Yangon 2,513,372 41,524 90,512 -48,988 
14 Shan 38,499,345 15,975,819 437,608 15,538,211 
15 Ayeyarwady 8,682,619 346,945 358,933 -11,988 
  Union 167,186,334 49,391,474 4,069,154 45,322,320 
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 2.2 Pathways of Large-Scale Land Acquisition for Agricultural 
Development 
We identified eight channels through which land is granted for large-scale agricultural 
development. They are schematically described in Figure 4. 
2.2.1 Military Commander, Chairman of the Region/State Peace and Development Council 
or Chief Minister of the Region/State 
In 1997, after the military power shuffle from SLORC to SPDC, the authority of the military 
commanders exceeded that of the ministers of the line ministries. The regional military 
commanders were also chairmen of the Region/State Peace and Development Councils. In that 
capacity, they had full authority to grant land and land use permits in their territories (see Figure 
4, pathway 1). The control the military had over land management was extensive:  
 Decision-making in granting a land use permit 
 Conversion of land categories 
 Coordination 
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Figure 4 - Pathways of large-scale land acquisition processes for agricultural development 
in Myanmar.  
Source: authors 
 In allocating land and land use permits, the military commanders gave preferential treatment to 
their family members. Among the military commanders, a common practice was also the 
reciprocal offering of land use permits. For example, the Kachin State commander allocated a 
large block of land in his State to the commander of Sagaing Region who, in return, did the same 
to his Kachin colleague. In the long list of land use permit recipients, care was also taken not to 
forget higher officials such as generals at headquarters, the heads of the regional civilian 
department or of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA). 
In most Regions/States, the list of the location and size of the large-scale blocks of land available 
for allocation was known to only two authorities: the regional commander and the regional head 
of the SLRD. Any private companies or domestic entrepreneurs wishing to acquire VFV land 
needed to contribute large sums of money in order to buy the land use permits. For example, one 
large company from Upper Myanmar went down to Ayeyarwady Region and donated a large sum 
of money to the Women’s Affairs Committee, which was headed by the wife of the military 
commander of that Region. The military commander granted a land use permit to access 5,000 
acres of land. This example illustrates a common practice: anyone willing to invest in agricultural 
development had to buy a land use permit from the military figure who had the authority to 
manage and control a particular area. The price of the land use permit to be paid by the company 
was then proportional to the rank of the military officer in charge. Also, the price went up if the 
purchaser wished to buy a large continuous block of VFV land. 
The military commanders could also exercise their power to grant grazing lands to their particular 
interest groups. For example, the Yangon Region commander allocated a large tract of buffalo 
grazing land within the Ma Shwe Oo Village of Htantabin Township to army officers and senior 
civilian officers in the name of paddy area expansion. The General Administration Department 
(GAD) consequently cancelled the existing status of the area - as grazing land - and the staff of 
the SLRD converted it into the category of ‘paddy land’. The regional commander and the land 
use permit holders conducted summer paddy cultivation on the land, with the support of 
government subsidies, for one to two years. A few years later, the commander‘s wife applied to 
convert the land to commercial aquaculture through a La Na 39 form9 (a permit to convert paddy 
land to another use). 
Another modality of collusion between private interest and the military rule – also known as crony 
capitalism10 - was when military personnel were directly recruited by a company. One food 
company in Mandalay, for instance, appointed a recently-retired deputy commander as a `special 
officer’ in a high-pay role to look for available VFV land. Through his connections to the military 
commander, a VFV land concession permit was granted.  
In short, the common practice was for the military regional commander to grant land to 
companies in which he or his relatives had direct interests. Access to land was shaped by these 
networks between military and crony companies with little respect for the rule of law.  
When the military rule was handed over to the quasi-civilian democratic government in March 
2011, some military regional commanders became the chief ministers of the same Regions/
States and, in that capacity, they retained control over land allocation. Some chief ministers were 
so strict that no land concessions within their Region/State could be allocated even at central/
Union level without their prior approval. 
2.2.2 Central Committee for the Management of Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Land  
The 1991 ‘Waste Land Instruction’ specified the powers of the Central Committee for VFV Land 
Management (CCVFVLM), to be chaired by the minister of Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation 
(MoAI, now MoALI). However, until 2010, most of decisions taken by CCVFVLM were heavily 
influenced by the military, particularly at sub-national level by the regional commanders. The election 
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 of 2010 brought a quasi-civilian government and in 2012, the Waste Land Instruction was 
replaced by the VFV Land Law. Even if the function and authority of Committee remains largely 
unchanged, the new CCVFVLM could progressively make decision independent of military 
orders. 
The rules and processes put in place under the 1991 Waste Land Instruction were deviant 
because they were used for the benefit of companies and people linked to land administration 
officers. For instance, a sugar factory company in Northern Shan State appointed a government 
land officer whose duty was to look for available lands for sugarcane expansion and to negotiate 
with farmers and land owners over the sale price. The director of a jade and gold mining 
company - who was also the wife of a former deputy minister - appointed a recently retired SLRD 
senior officer to look for available VFV land or permit holders to buy land before the price went 
up. The accumulated lands were not in a block but scattered. Lands along road sides were 
targeted as they could easily be resold. One large gold mining company, taking advantage of the 
favour of the agricultural minister, leased the ministry’s extensive estate farms at a cheap rate. 
The existing tenants were driven out (see Table 1, serial numbers 1 and 3). 
The 2012 VFV Land Law allows leases on State land categorized as Vacant Fallow and Virgin for 
up to 30 years. The CCVFVLM can allocate 5,000 acres at one time, up to a maximum of 50,000 
acres. However, several cases diverge from these legal principles (see Figure 4, pathway 2). The 
VFV Land Law indicates that the CCVFVLM should work with relevant government departments 
and organizations in order to protect the interests of farmers who are already using lands, 
whether formally recognized or not, in areas where the right to use VFV land has been granted. 
The land being used by the farmers is to be reclassified as farmland, and land use certificates 
issued to farmers who have been using the land (see Figure 4). However, these legal principles 
are not put into practice 
The VFV category also includes land that has been legally removed from the categories 
‘reserved forest’, ‘grazing land’, and ‘fish pond’. This implies that the CCVFVLM has jurisdiction 
over a huge area of land (see Figure 4, pathways 3, 4 and 5).  
The VFV Land Law allows the leasing of VFV land to foreign investors and foreign organizations, 
although it gives priority to Myanmar citizens (Oberndorf, 2012). 
2.2.3 Forest Department (MoNREC)  
While forest reserves can be converted into the VFV land category (see above), the 1992 Law on 
Forestry offers another pathway to grant land use permits for agricultural development on forest 
reserves. With approval from the Union government, MoNREC can change the category of an 
entire reserved forest or a portion of it (Article 7) and lease it as commercial or industrial 
plantation (Article 13) (see Figure 4, pathway 6). As indicated above however, no clear 
mechanism and procedure regulating how this is supposed to take place has been specified 
(Woods 2015a).  
If virgin land is still forested, CCVFVLM needs to make a request to Forest Department of 
MoNREC, which has authority over standing trees for a permit before a land use permit is issued 
by the CCVFVLM to initiate agro-industrial development (see Figure 4).  
2.2.4 The Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC)  
Large-scale agro-businesses need a permit from the Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC), 
ensuring that land leased either from the government or from a private citizen has a clear land 
use rights title.  
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 However, the Investment Law does not specify the land category that the investor is entitled to 
lease, which means that the investment can relate to either VFV land or to forest land, as 
prescribed in laws relating to those sectors. Furthermore, in concrete terms, the investors 
involved in agricultural development – domestic or foreign - need to obtain a full permit from the 
MIC but will continue to be accountable to MoALI and/or MoNREC in their business ventures (see 
Figure 4, pathway 8). 
The MIC delivers investment permits, or approval orders, based on the nature of the investment 
project. According to the Investment Law of 2106, foreign investors can lease land directly from 
the government through the proper channels (foreign or domestic direct investment) (see Figure 
5) or by forming a joint venture with the permit holder (indirect investment) (see Figure 6). 
In the case of foreign or domestic direct land-based investment, the investor needs to request an 
investment permit from the MIC through the Directorate of Investment and Company 
Administration (DICA). But the MIC alone does not have the authority to approve a project and 
must refer it to MoALI or MoNREC (or the relevant Region/State authorities) to conduct a proper 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA). This assessment – financed by the 
investor – must be conducted before the investor can receive the MIC permit. In the case of a 
joint venture, the Myanmar Investment Law states that the investor is not required to obtain land 
use authorization from the MIC if the Myanmar investor has complied with all of the laws and 
regulations.  
The MIC permit is issued after the investor has deposited a performance guarantee at the 
Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank at the prescribed rate. Until 2016, only 19 foreign direct investment 
(FDIs) permits had been authorized, comprising 17 for joint ventures with local partners and two 
with full investment coming from the government (MoALI). As of December 2015, FDI in the 
agriculture sector amounting to only USD 249.87 million had been authorized, accounting for only 
0.50 percent of total FDI in all sectors. The mechanism is rather new in Myanmar and, by 2017, 
no more than five foreign companies had registered for land-based agricultural investment.  
2.2.5 Authorized departments of the MoAI 
It is the prerogative of the Union minister of the MoAI to allocate land to his interest groups. In the 
ministry, some general managers of the administration are also heads of industrial crop 
enterprises or State farm development departments. In Pywin Oo Lwin and Naung Cho 
Townships, a general administration manager looked to acquire VFV land and forest areas for 
coffee or mulberry crop expansion.  
Figure 5 - Process of application and delivery 
of investment permits in the case of direct 
foreign or domestic investment  
Source: authors 
Figure 6 - Process of application and 
delivery of investment permit in the case 
of joint venture investment  
Source: authors 
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 He formed a coffee growers’ association with several officials and their close business 
companies. Following a request by the minister through Regional and Township level officers, 
land was allocated for a coffee plantation (see Figure 4, pathway 7). However, the land allocated 
was inside a forest area and, after negotiation with the Forest Department in 2016, the forest was 
de-gazetted and re-categorized as VFV land. A similar association focusing on growing mangoes 
was formed consisting of senior officers and directors in the ministry. Some medium-scale land 
was acquired in a VFV land area and renamed unofficially as a mango orchard area. The land 
was located in the Dekhina Thiri and Ottaya Thiri Townships of Napyitaw Council Region. This 
took place soon after the transition to the quasi-civilian government.  
2.2.6 Other forms of large-scale land acquisition 
In addition to the large-scale land acquisition processes described above, there are a variety of 
contract farming mechanisms that allow investors certain forms of control on land for agricultural 
development (Antonio, 2015; Woods, 2015b). 
It is difficult to gather a comprehensive picture of how these processes work across the country. 
By way of example, we describe here the land-based investment by Chinese entrepreneurs in 
watermelon production. The increased interest of Chinese entrepreneurs in farmland and 
agricultural production for commercial agro-business in Myanmar is leading to the activation of 
new forms of land acquisition that do not really fit into the categories of land use permits or land 
lease agreements with the State.  
The case we present here revolves around watermelon production in Mandalay, but a similar 
process is involved in banana production in Kachin State and sugarcane production in Koe Kant 
Special Administration Zone, near to the Chinese border.  
The land acquisition by Chinese entrepreneurs did not progress through regularized, formal 
channels, but through local brokers (see Figure 7). The Chinese investors hired translators and 
agronomists to look for appropriate land and to establish contact with farmers and Village Tract 
Administrators (VTAs) through their broker. Agreement was reached only between the farmers 
and the broker without the participation of the investors or the VTA chief. Once the deal was 
signed, the broker informed the relevant parties - including the VTA chief - about the number of 
acres that would be leased to wage labourers who were essentially Chinese workers. All through 
the process, the Chinese investors remained invisible to all the other parties involved.  
The farmers rented out their lands for a period of four to six months charging fees of USD 280 or 
USD 300 per acre in advance. The pre-payment was welcomed by the farmers. However, the 
land transaction was not based on an official contract between the farmers and the workers. 
Therefore, it was not considered to be contract farming and might instead be described as 
‘collective terms of agreement’ (Antonio, 2015). However, the agreement imposed restrictions on 
the farmers as they could not grow melons on other lands so that the exclusivity of the Chinese 
production could be guaranteed. In cases where the Chinese investors had built a well in a 
rented field, the farmer had to pay for its use once their field was returned: a fee of USD 200-250 
was required, almost equivalent to the land rental payment. Furthermore, farmers were not able 
to visit their fields, and other farmers or villagers could not trespass on the fields during the rental 
period. The Chinese investors used heavy doses of chemical fertilizers and pesticides during the 
rental period, which caused significant environmental pollution. 
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 Figure 7 – The land lease process in Chuang Kwa Village Tract, Tada Oo Township, 
Mandalay Region (2014).  
Source: Antonio, 2015 
 
Despite the heavy control over land and production exercised by Chinese investors, Antonio 
(2015) shows that the reasons why local farmers opted for this less-than-satisfactory land deal 
was their lack of, or limited, access to the Chinese market at the border, and their low investment 
capacity. 
In Tada Oo Township (Mandalay Region), Antonio (2015) estimates that the area under 
watermelon production through this land lease system amounted to 2,155 acres in 2012-2013 
and 3,285 acres in 2013-2014, producing 32,325 MT and 49,275 MT of watermelons in the 
corresponding years, and generating USD 17.3 million for the border trade from this Township.  
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3. Current Situation of Large-Scale Land Acquisition 
for Agricultural Development 
In the following section, we provide a synthesis of the current situation of large-scale agricultural 
development: the evolution and magnitude of the issues, the recipients and purpose of the 
investments, the spatial patterns of their distribution across the Union, the level of implementation 
of the land developments, and the profile of the main investors. 
3.1 An aggregate picture 
Based on the dataset monitoring land transactions on VFV land at MoALI (DALMS 2017a) and an 
aggregate figure of large-scale land acquisition on forest land (Department of Forestry 2013), 
from 1991 to October 2016, a total of 5,156,819 acres (=2,091,543 ha) of land was allocated by 
the government to agro-business companies (ABCs) and individual entrepreneurs (see Figure 8).  
The largest share of land – 2.2 M. acres - was allocated by the previous CCVFVLM (before the 
release of the new VFV Land Law in 2012) and the military commander (before the U Thein Sein 
government, 2011-2016) accounting for, respectively, 43 and 27 percent of the total land area. It 
should be noted that the percentage of VFV land granted that is actually planted is only 14.89 
percent (see more details below). 
As of November 2012, the Forest Department was directly overseeing large-scale agricultural 
development projects on permanent forest estates covering about 1.11 M acres. The total is 
probably higher now. This figure is much smaller than the total area of non-forest land use in 
reserved forest and Protected Public Forest (3.16 M. acres), which also includes land allocated 










Figure 8 - Total area of land granted for agricultural development in Myanmar by the 
relevant authorities 
Data Source: DALMS, 2017a and Forest Department, 2013. Computation by the authors 
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 concessions
11. Out of the 1.11 M acres de-gazetted for agricultural development, 0.46 m acres 
have been dedicated to palm oil production (41 percent), 0.37 M acres to rubber, sugarcane and 
other crops (33 percent) and 0.28 M acres to teak/hard wood plantations (25 percent) (Forest 
Department 2013) (see details in Annex 6). 
A quick look at the situation in other countries in the region shows that Myanmar is not, relatively, 
the country in which large-scale agricultural development is the most important. The total area 
covered by these transactions is 2.08 M. ha, which is slightly less than in Cambodia (2.1 M ha) 
but more than in Lao PDR (0.4 M. ha) and Vietnam (0.25 M. ha). The agro-business land 
transactions represent 3.08 percent of the national territory and nearly 16 percent of the total land 
cultivated by smallholder farmers, significantly less than in Cambodia and Lao PDR (see Table 
5). 
Table 5 – Agro-business concessions and agrarian structure in the CMLV (Cambodia, 
Myanmar, Lao PDR and Vietnam) countries. 
Sources: MRLG, 2017 
3.2 Agricultural large-scale land transactions on VFV land 
The database of land use permits granted on VFV land allows for a detailed analysis of this 
particular land category, which represents 78.4 percent of the area of all large-scale land use 
permits. As noted above, a detailed database consisting of all land transactions on VFV land from 
1991 to December 2016 was used to analyze the recipients, the granting authority, the 
geography, area sizes granted and planted. 
 Cambodia Lao PDR Myanmar Vietnam 
Agricultural concessions (ha) 2,160,349 446,410 2,086,894 253,841 
Total area of the country (ha) 18,103,500 23,796,000 67,657,800 33,121,000 
Percentage of concessions in the total 
area of the country 
11.93 % 1.88 % 3.08 % 0.77% 
Total area of smallholder farmers (ha) 3,200,000 1,100,000 13,100,000 10,000,000 
Ratio concessions area / smallholder 
farmers area 
67.51% 40.58% 15.93% 2.54% 
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 3.2.1 Overview 
Some basic computation shows a large number of transactions established since 1991. The 
mean is 1,075 acres (435 ha) but the distribution is quite dispersed (high standard deviation). The 
range between minimum and maximum value is important, with a maximum value of 157,353 
acres, well beyond the limit of 50,000 acres established by the VFV Land Law (see Table 6). 
The number of large-scale land transactions is high 
compared with other countries in the Mekong region: 
Cambodia can count 252 transactions since 1996, and 
Lao PDR 727 since 2000. On average, each land deal 
involves an area of 1,075 ha, significantly less than in 
Cambodia (8,385 ha/deal) and somewhat more than in 
Lao PDR (614 ha).  
3.2.2 Evolution in the granting of land use permits 
Land use permits have been granted on VFV land in an 
uneven way from 1991 up to the present (see Figure 9). 
Despite a peak in 1999, the granting of VFV land took 
place predominantly between 2006 and 2011 during the 
last years of the military government (SPDC) but also at 
the peak of the food crisis. In other aspects, most of the 
large-scale agricultural schemes visible today are a 
legacy of this particular period. In the early period, the 
SLORC government did not grant permits for timber 
extraction to companies. But after 2004-2005, the 
recipients of VFV land were granted permits for this 
purpose. Later they could sell the results of their logging 
to traders who acquired the timber export licence. In 
2008, companies were allowed to log all timber on the ground of VFV and forest lands. Such 
opportunities attracted all crony companies to conduct such extractive activities in the VFV land 
areas and there was a rush to acquire land use permits. This is one of the main reasons why the 
related area increased dramatically between 2007 and 2011. 
Up to 2006, the land use permits for VFV land were granted predominantly by regional 
commanders and to a lesser extent by the previous CCVFVLM. Between 2006 and 2011, the 
importance of both shifted with the CCFVFLM committee becoming the main body granting 
permits for VFV land. The arrival of the quasi-civilian government in 2011 was concomitant with a 
sharp decrease in the number of VFV land use permits granted, and in fact there was a 




Total area of 
land transactions 
3,875,964 acres 
Mean (area) 1,075 acres 
Median (area) 203 acres 
Std. Deviation 3,607 
Minimum 50.02 
Maximum 157,353 acres 
Data Source: DALMS, 2017a. Compu-
tation by the authors 
Table 6 - Description of VFV land 
allocated since 1991 for 
agricultural purposes in Myanmar  
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 Figure 9 - Evolution in the granting of land use permits on VFV land from 1991 to 2016 
Data Source: DALMS, 2017a. Computation by the authors  
3.2.3 Recipients and intended use of land 
Agro-business companies of various sizes received the largest share of VFV land for agricultural 
development (54 percent) (see Figure 10). Recipients identified in the database as private 
individuals (farm entrepreneurs, private investors or speculators) represent the second group in 
importance (32 percent of VFV land granted). The ‘military‘ category (8 percent) represents land 
granted to individual soldiers or to army camps. Organizations (6 percent) relates to Township or 
District level organizations such as the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), 
fire brigades, women’s associations and retired military associations (DALMS, 2017a).  
A limitation of the dataset is that it does not offer a very clear picture of the finality of the land-
based investment. More than 92 percent of the area is intended for agricultural purposes, but the 
type of crop is unspecified (see Figure 11). In addition, it provides information only about the 
intended use as it appears in the application process: limited information is available to compare 
the intended use with the actual use. 
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 However, another report from MoALI (DALMS 2017b) provides aggregate values only for agro-
business companies (ABCs) having acquired VFV land for agricultural development12. This 
shows a similar evolution (see Figure 12), i.e. a sharp increase between 2003 and 2013. The 
report also presents a more detailed view of the main crops planted by these companies (see 
Figure 13). Palm oil clearly stands out with 59 percent of the area engaged by ABCs involved in 




Figure 10 - Recipients of VFV land for agri-
cultural development 
Data Source: DALMS, 2017a. Computation by 
the authors 
Figure 11 - Intended use of VFV land for 
agricultural development 
Data Source: DALMS, 2017a. Computation 
by the authors 
  
Figure 12 - Evolution of the land area grant-
ed for large-scale agro-business compa-
nies by the MoAI. 
Data Source: DALMS, 2017b. Computation by 
the authors 
Figure 13 - Distribution of crop produc-
tion in areas granted to agro-industrial 
companies 
Data Source: DALMS, 2017b. Computation 
by the authors 
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 3.2.4 Spatial distribution of large-scale agricultural schemes on VFV land 
Geographically, land use permits for agricultural development on VFV land are distributed all 
across the country (see Figure 14). Large-scale land acquisitions have taken place in both central 
regions and ethnic peripheral States but are particularly concentrated in seven States/Regions. 
Kachin State – the third largest State in the country - is the State with the largest number of VFV 
land allocations, principally to military commanders (1,387,481 acres, 34 percent of the total). 
Sagaing Region is second, followed by Tanintharyi and Shan Regions in third and fourth position.  
Chin State possesses steep hills with only small areas of plain and no large valleys that could 
serve as natural barriers for LSLA. In Mon State there has been little scope for LSLA since many 
lands are already in the hands of small entrepreneurs and smallholder farmers for perennial 
crops (rubber and fruit trees). Indeed, as Mon ethnic people usually invest remittance money in 
purchasing land for rubber, the State is saturated with rubber plantations and orchards. In a 
coastal region like Rakhine State, LSLA applies mainly to aquaculture business and plantation 
crops. Moreover, a large-scale land area was allocated for Chinese gas pipelines across the 









Figure 14 - Distribution of VFV land area per State/Region 
Data Source: DALMS, 2017a. Computation by the authors  
The map below (Figure 15) shows the distribution of VFV land allocations per Village Tract or 
Township13. It reveals that the largest VFV land grants are located in peripheral regions and the 
smaller ones are more central (in the dry zone and delta). Kachin State is characterized by very 
large VFV land grants of more than 50,000 acres and the South of Thanintharyi by VFV land of 
5000 to 50,000 acres. In contrast, regions such as Sagaing and Magwe have land grants that are 
mainly under 5,000 acres in size.  
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  Figure 15 - Location map of VFV land granted in Myanmar between 1991 and 2016 
 Data Source: DALMS, 2017a. Mapping by the authors  
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 3.2.5 Land use effectiveness 
Out of the 3,875,964 acres of VFV land granted for agriculture purposes, only 14.89 percent have 
actually been cultivated (see Table 7). The majority is left idle. The figure may be even more 
pronounced as it is not unusual for a VFV land grant holder to rent out land to local smallholder 
farmers and declare such lands as being used and under ‘joint venture’ or ‘contract farming’ 
arrangements. This poses serious questions regarding the efficiency of large-scale agricultural 
models being promoted in Myanmar. It also provides strong evidence - originating from 
government statistics - that coherently demonstrates across all States and Regions that such 
large-scale agricultural models do not promote higher land use efficiency. This is contrary to the 
pro-agro-business narratives undermining smallholder farming.  
Table 7 - Level of implementation of agricultural developments on VFV permit areas  
Data Source: DALMS, 2017a. Computation by the authors  
When considering all land transactions in VFV land (including those involving land areas less 
than 50 acres), the percentage of land cultivated goes up to 18.2 percent. Interestingly, we found 
an inverse relationship between the area of VFV land granted and the percentage of land 
effectively planted (correlation = - 0.1, significant at the 0.01 level). Specifically, this means that 
farmers with smaller VFV land grants tend to cultivate land more effectively than farmers with 
larger VFV landholdings (see Figure 16). The graph clearly shows that land remaining unplanted 
is more important, in absolute and relative terms, for land use permit holders who cultivate more 
than 500 acres. 
 
  






Only cases > 50 acres 
Area (in acres) 3,875,964 562,829 3,313,134 
Percentage of land 
cultivated in total 
14.5 % 
Including cases < 50 acres 
Area (in acres) 3,968,315 611,673 3,356,642 
Percentage of land 
cultivated in total 
18.2 % 










Figure 16 - Relation between VFV land area and land use efficiency 
Data Source: DALMS, 2017a. Computation by the authors  
Table 8 presents a summary of the distribution of VFV land (number of transactions, area in 
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 3.2.6 Key investors 
The database establishes the profile of some key investors in Myanmar (Table 9 and Figure 17).  
Table 9 - Land acreage of the eight most important investors in VFV land, by total acres 
granted  
 
Data Source: DALMS, 2017a. Computation by the authors  
Yuzana Co. and Htoo Trading Company, the two most important - by total acres granted -agro-
business companies in operation in Myanmar, have received the largest amount of land with a 
cumulative area of 514,169 and 124,031 acres, respectively (see Table 9 and Annex 8). These 
areas are far beyond the upper limit of 50,000 acres prescribed in the duties and power of the 
CCVFVLM. 
If we refer to Tanintharyi Region as a whole (and not only Yuzana and Htoo Trading Companies) 
the land granted by the regional authority is not in reality virgin and fallow land but is largely 
reserved forest area - part of the well-known Pachan reserve forest (Annex 9). This has allowed 
some companies such as Htoo Trading Co. to use the pretext of a palm oil plantation to actually 
engage in significant timber extraction. In some areas of the State, forest trees have been logged 
before the arrival of the palm oil company (interview with the South Dagon Palm-Oil Co.). 
The Yuzana Company holds land under different company names such as Annawa Tun and 
Shwe Myae Yadana. The Yuzana Company alone took 350,550 acres from the forest area for a 
palm oil plantation, and, as of today, fieldwork conducted for this survey has revealed that the 
company has continued to apply for more land from MoNREC. Moreover, there are several other 
subsidiary companies that have acquired land for Yuzana Company, which means that it might 
have acquired more than 514,169 acres. 
# Investor name Total area in acres 
1 Yuzana company 514,169 
2 Htoo Company 124,031 
3 Great Wall Co. 108,175 
4 U Than Zaw Shwe 91,288 
5 SI 63,597 
6 Daw Thiri Swe 32,862 
7 USDA 14,886 
8 U Toe Naing Mann 7,537 
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 Figure 17 - Location map of the VFV land of the eight most important investors.  
Data Source: DALMS, 2017a. Mapping by the authors  
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4. Large-Scale Agriculture and Smallholder Farmers’ 
Land Rights: a Source of Conflict 
The granting of large tracts of land for agricultural development has resulted in different forms of 
land conflict across Myanmar. These conflicts have increased as smallholder farmers (and their 
supporters) have claimed rights over the land.  
An examination of land conflicts across the country and the ways in which State and non-State 
actors have dealt with the issues, is beyond the scope of this report. Instead we endeavour here 
to discuss the extent to which large-scale agricultural development drives conflicts and how they 
have been addressed by the previous and current governments.  
4.1 Land dispossession of smallholder farmers 
The core issue underlying conflicts associated with large-scale land acquisition revolves around 
land dispossession, as land acquired by agro-business companies or individual entrepreneurs 
has quite often already been appropriated for agricultural production or use as a common pool 
resource by smallholder farmers. The encroachment on these resources by large-scale 
plantations has excluded the smallholder farmers from resources that are essential to them in 
conducting their livelihoods, and their quest for additional land and access to natural resources is 
a main element underlying their land claims.  
In most cases, the overlap of land claims results from a poor identification of land allocated and/
or inadequate recognition of existing rights to use the land for a variety of purposes (cultivation, 
grazing, swidden fallow, and so on). In fact, smallholder farmers are hampered by a rather weak 
statutory recognition of their land tenure (see above) and by the poor implementation of legally 
defined procedures to identify and allocate such lands. Quite often, they are considered to be 
illegal occupants or ‘squatters’ on the land and are evicted to clear the way for agricultural 
investors.  
It is actually quite difficult to quantify these overlapping claims. A notable exception is the detailed 
investigation by Parliamentary Commission member U Sein Win (2013, separate report) in his 
constituency of Maubin. U Sein Win’s report highlights the complexity of the situation on the 
ground. It presents the case of large land areas assigned for companies acting on VFV land 
permits, or delta flood plain (in the delta region) areas actually overlapping with areas previously 
occupied and cultivated by farmers (see Table 10). The report also shows another important 
aspect of this problem. Because companies have not fully developed these large tracts of land, 
local farmers have opportunistically occupied them and started to exploit the land left idle. These 
situations typically involve companies who only develop the best portions of their lands - those 
that are situated along main roads and irrigation/drainage channels - chasing away primary 
occupants of the land who have monitored the development of the concession and have decided 
to return to the land that has not been developed. 
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 A variant of the land conflict has occurred when villages have been relocated due to the 
construction of large dam projects (see, for instance, the text box below). The government 
allocated farmland or VFV land as compensation for smallholder farmers who had lost settlement 
and agricultural land to the hydropower companies. And, very often, these areas of land were 
already occupied by farmers who were deemed illegal and driven away to make space for the 
newcomers.  
4.2 Land claims by smallholder farmers: a view from the Parliamentary 
Investigation Commission on Land Confiscation (2012-2016) 
In 2012, the government responded to the prevalence of land conflicts by establishing an 
Investigation Commission for the Prevention of Public Disenfranchisements Connected to the 
Confiscation of Farmland and Other Lands, also known as the Parliamentary Land Investigation 
Commission. The Commission was assigned to identify and scrutinize cases considered by 
farmers to be illegal grabs and to propose solutions to release the land to its original owner, in 
most cases a smallholder farming family (Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2013a).  
Smallholder farmers’ land dispossession by the Lashio military battalion, Shan State 
Kaung Home Village, Min Tin VT 
In Lashio Township in northern Shan State, four Kachin Villages, established around 1969, were 
removed by Lashio army Kha La Ya 41 from their original location and relocated to the surrounding area 
of the Shan Villages near the main road. The move was an attempt to curb the villagers’ ability to shelter 
insurgents. Without any government support, the Kachin villagers built their houses but had to go back to 
their former taungya hillside fields – a more than three hour walk. Because of the distance, they could not 
take sufficient care of their fields. The crop yields declined, which adversely affected their food security. 
They endured hardship for more than 30 years. 
Shan villagers were growing groundnuts on the uplands with a rotational fallow land system while they 
grew paddy in the lowlands. The nearby military division in Shan North assumed that the fallow lands on 
the hilly areas were free and grabbed up to 4,000 acres on which eight Shan villages were cultivating 
upland crops. The military force granted land use permits to a private business company thought to be 
owned by a rich man (a Lawpan) from Chin Shwe Haw, and they then formed the Sein Wut Mhon rubber 
plantation as a joint venture business. The Shan villagers lost the uplands areas they had been 
cultivating and moved to other upland areas where the Kachin people were working. Lands were shared 
between both communities with unsecured livelihoods. But the Shan people were in the majority and the 
Kachin could not resist their demand for upland areas. Since then, the livelihoods of the Kachin people 
have deteriorated: some people depend on daily wage jobs in the new rubber plantation, and some 
migrate to China for seasonal work. In Kachin villages, the proportion of widows has increased up to a 
third of the households. According to them their husbands fell ill during migration, came back home and 
died. 
The case study conducted by the first author in September, 2013 
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 Identifying and scrutinizing land conflicts was one very important step towards more justice in the 
land sector. However, the Commission had no authority to address land disputes and the 
decision to resolve the conflicts was deferred to another executive body, namely the Central 
Committee for Land Use Management (CCLUM), formed under the quasi-civilian government led 
by President U Thein Sein. Vice–President U Nyan Win was appointed chairman of this 
Committee, and its members were drawn from all ministries. The Union minister and deputy 
minister of the Ministry of Home Affairs acted, respectively, as deputy chair and secretary of the 
CCLUM (see Figure 18).  
Figure 18 - Architecture of land institutions in the previous government (2011-2015) 
Source: authors 
 
Institutionally, the reporting of cases/recommendations has passed from the director general of 
the Parliament Office to the director general of the Union government office. From 13 September 
2013 to 21 January 2016, the Commission sent a series of 18 reports to the Union government 
office. 
The last report indicated that 14,756 individual complaints had been received and filed. The 
reports 5 to 16 were not released to the public, but the first author of this study team was able to 
review them. It appeared that none of them contained quantitative figures on land areas that had 
been confiscated or the number of farmers who had lost land; they mentioned only the number of 
complaints and the number of cases scrutinized. Some cases could involve dozens of farmers, 
while others might consider only one. In order to work with one consistent dataset, we decided to  
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 focus our analysis on reports 1 to 4
14. Each of these relates to transactions with a specific type of 
confiscation: i.e. the first report related to transactions with complaints about land confiscated by 
the military (Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2013a), the second report involved transactions 
with complaints about confiscation by urbanization/industrialization projects (Republic of the 
Union of Myanmar, 2013b), the third, transport infrastructure as well as agriculture-related land 
confiscation (Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2013c), and the fourth, other cases that were 
not been mentioned in previous reports but that pertained to similar categories (Republic of the 
Union of Myanmar, 2013d).  
In an earlier study examining these reports, we argued that the dataset presents serious 
shortcomings in that it fails to provide detailed information about land grabs by the military. The 
work of the Commission seems to have targeted urban areas and urbanization projects, which is 
a view supported by the preponderance of cases in the Yangon, Mandalay and Ayeyarwaddy 
urban agglomerations as well as by the central role played by the Ministry of Construction as the 
main body involved in land confiscation. By contrasting the locations of land confiscation cases 
with those of agro-industrial concessions as of 2011, we also show how the Commission has 
evaded, rather than tackled, some very critical land confiscation issues driven by these 
concessions (San Thein et al., 2017). Some very critical land confiscation issues driven by these 
concessions, particularity in Kachin State and Tanintharyi Region (San Thein, Pyae Sone and 
Diepart, 2017). These two areas encompass a high number of concessions and have not been 
studied by the Commission for security reasons 
As can be seen in Table 11 below, the total area of land investigated - that was subject to 
confiscation - is 489,369 acres (51.5 percent were military-driven land confiscations). These are 
aggregate figures, stated as such in the reports, and are not the result of our own computation.  
The other development projects that have sparked land disputes and complaints have more to do 
with infrastructure and urbanization projects. According to the report of the Parliament (2013, 
parts 2 and 3), 110 cases of land disputes concerned land confiscated from farmers for 
agricultural development, including by agro-business companies, involving an area estimated to 
be around 82,437 acres (Table 11), in various parts of the countries.  
Table 11 - Total land area confiscated by development projects in respect of which 
farmers sent complaints to the Parliamentary Commission and that were accepted by the 
Commission 
Source: The Parliamentary Investigation Commission for the Prevention of Public Disenfranchisements 
Connected to the Confiscation of Farmlands and Other Lands. (The inventory of reported data was 
processed to categorize the land confiscations conducted through various activities.) 
Development project purpose Land area (acres) Percent of total 
Military (unspecified) 251,865 51.5% 
Industrial zones in Yangon + a few in another two 
towns 
117,834 24.1% 
Agro-industrial development (by agro-business 
companies, ministries, or for military staff welfare) 
82,437 16.8% 
Infrastructure projects (by government) 32,644 6.7% 
Industrial zones (excluding Yangon area) 3,545 0.7% 
Unknown 1,044 0.2% 
Total 489,369 100.0% 
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 Looking at the dataset with a focus on the agencies primarily involved in land confiscation we 
found that, in addition to the military, the main agencies involved were ministries (135,546 acres 
= 27.7 percent) and companies (54,002 acres = 11.1 percent) (see Figure 19).  
We estimate that complaints from farmers about land confiscation involving the MoAI related to 
40,019 acres, divided among four key departments (see Figure 20). If we deduct this amount 
from the total area of 82,437 acres of land confiscated for agro-industrial development (Table 11), 
the remaining area (42,418 acres) represents the total area of land confiscated by agro-business 
companies and for activities undertaken in respect of civil servant welfare schemes.  
One part of this area has been encroached by opportunistic claimants and is under effective use 
by smallholder farmers. In all likelihood however, this area of 42,418 acres is a serious under-
estimation of the actual degree of land confiscations by companies. It is likely that this figure is 
disproportionately low when compared with the number of issues reported by researchers, 
activists and the media (Buchanan, Kramer and Woods, 2013; Chao, 2013; LIOH, 2015; Woods, 
2015a). This is because many disputes have not been reported to the Commission. 
4.3 The current ‘land return’ conundrum  
In March 2016, a new government took over and ‘land issues’ were one of its priorities. On 9 
June 2016, this new government established a Central Reinvestigation Committee for 
Confiscated Farmlands and Other Lands (commonly called Myae Sit in Burmese) to continue the 
work of the previous Parliamentary Commission on land investigation (now dissolved) towards 
the return of land. 
But the committee goes further. It is not only tasked with investigating land confiscation issues 
but also with ensuring that unused lands (including LSLA involving companies, the government 
and military organizations) are effectively returned to the farmers who are entitled to it.  
In fact, the process of reviewing the complaints and returning the land is complex for Myae Sit, 
and some members admit that only a small percentage of farmers who have complained to their 
office will effectively be able to reclaim their land (personal communication) due to ongoing conflicts  
 
  
Figure 19 - Main agencies involved in land 
confiscation 
Figure 20 - Main departments of MoALI 
involved in land confiscation 
Source: The Parliamentary Investigation Commission for the Prevention of Public Disenfran-
chisements Connected to the Confiscation of Farmlands and Other Lands. Data computation 
by the authors 
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 and overlapping claims to lands from various stakeholders (original owners, tenants who 
occupied the lands after the confiscation, recent occupants including opportunistic ones and 
landless people who would like to access the lands).  
A particularly difficult aspect of the process is to define eligibility criteria to identify who is the 
rightful land owner and to verify such information. Another challenge is to identify the people who 
need the land most to sustain their livelihoods. This requires that the history of land occupation in 
the area, as well as the complexity of the processes that have excluded smallholder farmers from 
access to the land, are understood and documented. In addition, decision-making on land 
allocation would need a clear mechanism for conflict resolution. Formal institutions as such as 
Farmland Administration Bodies (FAB) and DALMS are not in a position to resolve conflicts and it 
is not in their mandate (Boutry et al, 2017). In such a context, many conflicts remain unresolved.  
However, it goes beyond the scope of this study on large-scale agricultural land acquisition to 
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
The objective of this study was to provide a synthesis of historical and contemporary processes 
of large-scale land acquisition for agricultural development in Myanmar. It relies essentially on 
secondary sources, complementary interviews and field work conducted by the first author.  
A summary of the key findings is proposed in the executive summary. By way of conclusion, we 
aim to formulate a set of general recommendations that could inform a wider and multi-
stakeholder dialogue on the issue of large-scale land acquisition for agricultural development. 
Given the current legal framework, the lack of institutional capacity to implement the regulations 
as stipulated in the laws and the outdated status of the information on VFV land, it is necessary 
to establish a moratorium on new large-scale land acquisition, unless the following issues are 
properly addressed:  
 Information: a process should be identified to improve the collection, the management 
and the analysis of reliable data related to land use and tenure, and to LSLAs, in order to 
inform day-to-day decision making and policy making. 
- Conduct an audit of VFV land grants: a systematic basic survey of past VFV land 
grants could be conducted to also evaluate if VFV concessions are still in the hands of 
the initial grantees or if they have been illegally sold or transferred to other 
stakeholders. In addition, the survey could assess whether the lands are used as 
intended (in the application). It could also identify current users of the lands so that 
this this information could be taken into account in case VFV land grants are revoked. 
As proposed in Myanmar’s agricultural development strategy, this could be done 
through a combination of remote sensing and field checking. The results of such a 
survey could then be used to inform decision-making in respect of the cancellation of 
these VFV land grants and what the next steps should be. The survey would need to 
be conducted within a short, yet realistic, timeframe with the involvement of 
government, civil society and other third parties.  
- Conduct an in-depth and comprehensive evaluation of large-scale agricultural 
development schemes up to now in Myanmar: this would enable an evaluation to 
be undertaken to assess their efficiency and sustainability using various criteria 
including the prevalence of conflicts, contribution to local employment, and agricultural 
production and environmental protection. The narratives on the higher efficiency and 
economies of scale of large-scale agriculture need to be evaluated given the fact that 
they have been used repeatedly to influence the orientation of policy, at the expense 
of smallholder farming. This work could also be an opportunity to evaluate the need 
for land among the current and future generations of smallholder farmers. This review 
process could be conducted jointly with stakeholders from government, academia and 
civil society. 
- Improve data management on VFV land grants and other large–scale agro-
investments: due to a lack of transparency in respect of most large-scale land 
transactions, information related to land boundaries is often non-existent, inaccurate 
or incomplete. This leads to a vicious cycle: since the information is inaccurate, 
authorities do not disseminate it, neither do they process it to analyse the trends in 
terms of investments, and so on. LSLA policies are thus implemented in a blind way 
with no knowledge of their actual impact.  
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 There is an opportunity for authorities to accept their data, and become more familiar 
with it to see its flaws and progressively improve it with a mid-term vision supported by 
capacity building.  
- Land information: as mentioned in the report, a large proportion of the country’s land 
area is still considered legally to be VFV land. This is in spite of existing local rights 
over land and natural resources which may be crucial for livelihoods but also for 
environmental and cultural protection. Detailed recommendations for improved land 
administration go beyond the scope of this study. The agricultural development 
strategy suggests a strengthening of the capacity of land administration services and 
their support institutions to update and generate cadastral information, register land 
holding titles, document customary land rights, maintain land management systems, 
and produce new ‘kwin’ maps. The biggest challenge to address this relates more to 
institutional constraints rather than to technological ones.  
- Enable public access to data related to large-scale agricultural development 
schemes: this data could also be available for local authorities at Village Tract and 
Township levels to enable a comparison to be made with the ground situation. 
Projects such as One Map could be instrumental in achieving this. Official information 
about VFV land applications and objections could be publicized through the usual 
bulletin board but also through local media and on line.  
 Improving institutional capacity in order to avoid abuses of power and to implement the 
provisions of existing laws and rules:  
- Enforcement of VFV land management rules in terms of regulations relating to 
current VFV land grantees: the current VFV Land Law makes explicit mention of 
prior public information on VFV land applications, the possibility to object to these, and 
the need to verify whether or not the land is actually vacant. Chapter II also mentions 
the need to specify in the application forms ‘whether the lands are in fact vacant, 
fallow and virgin lands’. But it fails to clearly define procedures to verify land claims on 
the ground. Article 48 of Chapter 5 of the VFV land management rules also mentions 
that the grant may be revoked if grantees fail to implement their proposed project and 
comply with the rules. It also refers to the Central Committee who shall conduct 
‘constant supervision of the land utilization or cultivation by the person granted rights’.  
- Checks and balances: these are necessary given the high potential for collusion 
between private actors or government in respect of mutual interests. The CCVFVLM 
cannot to be simultaneously in charge of land allocation and of the associated 
monitoring. Given the high risks of a conflict of interests, monitoring needs to be 
conducted by another institution in order to create a check-and-balance relationship 
conducive to transparency and to responsible agribusiness practices. This is a basis 
to establish a monitoring and evaluation system that would be responsible to 
scrutinize the performance of the companies and their commitment to social and 
environmental safeguards. The underlying objective of this M&E system is the need to 
regulate much-needed investments in the agricultural sector in order to promote 
development with equity.  
- Avoid the criminalisation of informal occupancy of lands  
 Concerning the legal framework.  
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 - It is also necessary to develop an umbrella land law, based on the guidelines and 
principles of the over-arching National Land use Policy. This process could mobilize a 
genuine and inclusive, multi-stakeholder public consultation process. This law would 
need to address the unresolved gaps such as the recognition of customary tenure and 
mechanisms for conflict resolution and accountability of the authorities involved in land 
administration. It could also address contradictions in ‘overlaid’ laws and should aim to 
harmonize the existing pieces of legislation including the sectoral laws such as the 
Farmland Law, the VFV Land Management Law, the Forest Law, and so on, to ensure 
consistency. This would be particularly pertinent for the recognition of local land and 
resource rights which exist at community level but may not been have registered 
formally. One crucial issue involves a need to address the gap concerning forest 
areas that are ‘non-public forest estates’. This could include the revision of land use 
categories (see below).  
- Revise the definition of land categories and the procedure to convert land categories.  
 Applying sufficient land tax on the VFV land grants which may be high enough to 
dissuade land speculation (eg: an annual tax of 5 to 10 percent of the land’s estimated 
value) 
- After the moratorium, if the government is willing to promote agricultural investment 
and development through LSLA, clear procedures could be established to identify and 
monitor large-scale agricultural land acquisitions in ways that promote responsible 
agricultural investment. This includes a respect for smallholder farmers’ customary 
tenure, the effective participation of women, an appropriate and enforceable legal 
framework, support and mediation from local authorities, affordable access to credit, 
and encouragement for the diversification of crops and livelihood activities (MRLG 
2017). 
 Return of land and conflict resolution 
- Building on the agricultural development strategy, which already plans the 
development of a clear legal and institutional framework describing how different 
mechanisms to address land conflicts can be used and possibly be integrated under 
one comprehensive system: it is crucial to improve conflict resolution processes at the 
ground level. The National Land Use Policy (NLUP) identifies the following 
mechanisms: (i) Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) at the local level with the 
involvement of farmers’ associations; (ii) special courts; (iii) independent arbitration; 
(iv) regular courts; and (v) administrative adjudication. Clear procedures for each of 
these dispute resolution mechanisms will need to be developed. 
- Determine responsibilities and mechanisms to re-allocate reclaimed land to farmers, 
the State or third parties - identify land to be returned, and specify eligibility criteria to 
identify land recipients.  
- Ensure that the composition of the land reinvestigation committee does not create 
conflicts of interest: it is often the case that committee members are themselves 
directly involved in land confiscation. 
- Integrate the basic principle of ‘adverse possession’ into conflict resolution processes. 
This supports claims of legal ownership based upon a history of possession or 
occupation of the land without the permission of the legal owner. 
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1 The land transactions in respect of VFV land less than 50 acres were important in terms of 
number (n=4,802, 57 percent of the total) but did not represent a significant share of the total 
area (92,351 acres = 2 percent of total) 
2 Through the meeting of the first Union Parliament’s (Pyidaung Su Hluttaw) fourth normal 
session, 8 August 2012 
3 Duties and Rights of the Central Committee for the Management of Cultural Land, Fallow Land 
and Waste Land (1991), issued by the State Law and Order Restoration Council, Union of 
Myanmar. Notification No. 44/91.13 November 1991, and Procedures conferring the right to 
cultivate land/ right to utilize land (1991), issued by the State Law and Order Restoration Council, 
Union of Myanmar. Notification No. 1/91.16 December 1991 
4 The Ministry of Agriculture has been transformed into different structures and titles such as the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forests (MoAF), the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MoAI), and 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation (MoALI). MoAF existed during the socialist 
period, MoAI during the SLORC/SPDC military rule and MoALI during the democratic republic 
government of the present day. The use of the ministry title in this study will be in accordance 
with the respective political period 
5 The amount of land grabbed was recorded as 247,077.06 acres by the Parliamentary Land 
Confiscation Investigation Commission during the time of the previous 2011-2015 quasi-civilian 
government. This figure is probably underestimated and does not include the land grabbed by the 
military prior to 1988  
6 According to the Parliamentary Land Confiscation Investigation Commission, there were 452 
cases of complaints about land loss related to the MoAI, and the problems caused by dam 
construction constituted 233 cases, over 50 percent of the whole number that were a ministry 
responsibility 
7 Both laws are in a process of revision 
8 The Naypyidaw Council or Regional or State government can approve or reject applications for 
the right to work on vacant, fallow and virgin lands not exceeding 50 acres, by rural farmers and 
families wishing to carry out manageable agricultural projects 
9 A special permit allowing the land user to use the land for purposes other than agricultural 
10 A crony company is a company with direct links to military personnel or their family members 
and therefore accessing specific privileges in terms of business licence or land as in these 
instances 
11 In fact the figure is much larger but we could not access more accurate figures and it was also 
not the main purpose of this investigation into agro-industrial land transactions 
12 - which are slightly different from those resulting from our own computation because they do 
not differentiate between small and large land transactions as we did 
13 The point does not reflect the actual location of the concession but the centre of the Township. 
The size of the point is in proportion to the total area of VFV land on agro-industrial land granted 
in that particular Township 




Annex 1 - Brief chronology of the political economy in Myanmar 
 
Period Political Regime Economics and Agricultural Policy Measures 
1886-1948 British colony 
Free enterprises and little intervention by Govt. With 
over 7 million MT of rice exported, market leader in 
the world. 
4 January 1948 Independent, civilian govt. Economic nationalism and free market mechanism 
Up to 1962 Parliamentary democracy Economic nationalism and free market 
1962 to 1974 
Military coup, Revolutionary 
Council 
Nationalism and Burmanization; total self-reliance 
period. Socialist land tenure system; 
1974 
Socialist Republic of the 
Union of Burma (military-
led) 
Socialist economic system; centralized planning; 
self-reliance and command economy; civil service 
structure started deteriorating 
1974 to 1988 
Socialist Republic of the 
Union of Burma; Peoples’ 
Council Govt. 
Isolated command economy; period of economic 
stress; import substitution; industrialization; the 
country fell to LDC status 
1988 
Political upheaval; military 
took over the country on 18 
September 1988 
Abolition of socialist economic systems; adopted 
swing-door policy under market-oriented economy 
1988 to November 
1997 
State Law and Order Resto-
ration Council (SLORC), 
military rule 
Partial liberalization of economy; opening of econo-
my to foreign firms 
1997 to 2011 
State Peace and Develop-
ment Council (SPDC) mili-
tary rule 
Transition to market economy; crony capitalism; 
poverty incidence measured at 26 percent (2011) 
slightly falling from 32 percent in 2005 at the Union 
level 
2011 to March 2016 
The Government of the Re-
public of the Union of Myan-
mar 
Parliamentary democracy, quasi civilian govt.; mar-
ket economy; economic, financial, and monetary 
reforms and trade and investment liberalization; 
crony capitalism; land grabbing and corruption con-
tinued; could not move poverty line 
November 2015 
General Election and Na-
tional League for Democra-
cy (NLD) opposition party 
wins with landslide victory 
End of March 2016 witnesses the hand-over of pow-
er from the quasi democracy government to the 
Democratic NLD Party for the executive and legisla-
tive power 
April 2016 
NLD-led government and 
Parliament (Hluttaw) head-
ed by the State Counselor 
Daw Aung San Su Kyi 
Power transfer in April 2016 
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Year  Events in land- based investments in the sugar industry 
3rd Anglo-  
Burmese War 
(1885) 
A Maharaja who fought with the British was honoured by the British govern-
ment who granted a large amount of land in the vicinity of Zeyawaddy, Burma 
to his relict, Maha Devi. The grant emanated from Queen Victoria, British Em-
press, in recognition of the Maharaja’s loyalty 
  
The Maha Devi passed the grant on to an Indian serviceman of great loyalty to 
her. This man became the owner and, with Indian labourers from Bihar, 
cleared the jungle on the land that had been granted (Zeyarwaddy) and con-
verted it into paddy fields 
1932 
Mr. Rai Bahadur Harikar Prasad, son of the owner of the land that had been 
granted at Zeyawaddy, cultivated sugarcane instead of paddy. He used Indian 
tenants 
1934 
R.B.H Prasad constructed a sugar factory with the capacity to crush 1,000 
tons of sugarcane per day. This factory was constructed by the Duncan Stew-
art Company of Scotland, and began to operate in 1935 
1937-38 Production of white sugar exceeded 18,000 tons 
  
The cane that was crushed came from Taungoo and Yamethin Districts and 
acreage rose to 34,714 (1937-38). This represented the largest cane and sug-
ar output in Myanmar at that time 
1954 
The factory was nationalized by the New Independent Myanmar Government. 
It was managed by the Ministry of Industry No.1 (MI-1) 
Date unknown The factory was transferred to the MoAI from MI-1 
Date unknown MI-1 took back the factory from the MoAI 
 Date unknown MI-1 leased the factory to a private company 
2010 




 Annex 3 - Life of a rubber plantation in Taninthary Region 
 
Year Milestones for old natural rubber estates 
1908 
Under British colonial rule, land was granted to the applicants who were mostly 
British companies. Crown Rubber Co. was the pioneer 
1920 
The number of rubber estates increased in terms of the number of companies 
and the acreage 
WW II 
Plantations were destroyed. Local people grabbed the land and estates were di-
vided 
Japanese rule The Japanese rulers recognized the original owners 
Post WWII Rehabilitation of natural rubber estates 
1964 The military (Revolutionary Council) nationalized the large rubber estates 
Until 1988 State–ownership continued during the socialist rule 
1988-2010 
Political upheaval and military rule continued (SLORC/SPDC); rubber estates 
were under the ownership of the MoAI; the Ministry of Industry and the military–
operated economic cooperation and holdings took some rubber estates from the 
MoAI 
2010 Production failed under the MoAI and the Ministry of Industry (1) 
  
The military government privatized some rubber estates operated by the minis-
tries 
Date unknown An authorized minister sold rubber estates to his close interest groups 
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 Annex 4 - Land granted under the military regime to agro-business 














Island, Baw Di east 
41,808 
Maubin West Ayeyarwady   
Pantanaw Kwin   











Danubyu Ye kyaw kwin   








Nyaungdone San Kin 30,000 
Danubyu     
6 Ayeyar Shwewar 
Thar Baung 




Kan Gyi Daung 
kwin 
33,547 
Kyaung Kone     
Kan Gyi Daung     




8 Myanmar Golden Star Maubin Thone Gwa Island 5,600 















Pantanaw Baw Di West 5,082 
13 Toetetaung Agric. Co. Pantanaw Baw Di West 470 
14 Golden Green Agric. Kyaung Kone 
Ye Tar Gyi Gyi 
Aine 
5,556 
15 Klo Sein Agric. Co. Inn Ga Pu Klo Sein 5,858 
16 
Military camps, West-
ern South Command 
Thar Baung Sit Pin Gyi 2,075 
17 U Saw Win Thar Baung Sit Pin Gyi 1,000 






tion & Engineering Co. 







1 Ministry of Home Affairs Taik Kyi Sin Gyan 2,000 
2 
Yangon City Development 
Committee (YCDC) 




Htanta bin/TK   18,000 
4 
Golden Plough & Agric. 
Mechanization Dept. 
Taik Kyi Sin Gyan 2,080 
5 Steel Stone Group TK & Htantabin   5,000 
Total 28,580 
Magwae 
1 Myanmar Billion Group Min Bu Sa Pho 29,000 
2 Yu Za Na Group 
Min Bu Kyi Kan 30,000 
Min Hla Kan Boke   
3 Service Int’l (SI) Co. Ltd. 
Nga Phe   40,000 
Sa Lin     
5 Shwe Family Sin Baung We Ko Pin 10,000 
6 Shwe Ta Zin Syndicate Sin Baung We Thar Zi 20,000 
7 Aung Htaik Min Co. 
Taung Dwin Gyi Ye Twin Gaung 7,000 
Aung Lan Shwe Pan Taw   
8 Olympic Co. Sin Baung We Aye Ka Yit 5,000 
9 Asia World Co. Sa Lin Te Bo Kan 10,000 
10 Dagon Int’l Pwint Phyu Ye Boke Gyi 36,000 
  Total 198,400 
Source: The Mirror 19 January 1999 
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 Annex 5 – Allocation of forest and virgin lands to agro-business 
companies for palm oil plantations in Tanintharyi Region (total area of 
land granted to individual companies from 1995 to the reporting 






With or without 
mill 
 Remarks 
 Yuzana 1 144,787 144,787 60 FFB* ton/hr (1) 
In Kawthoung Township, Malaysia–
made CPO mill, refinery mill (1) in Yan-
gon 
Annawa Tun 37,955 19,756 60 FFB ton/hr (1) Yuzana company in a different name 
Shwwe Myay 
Yadana 
29,100 6,600   Yuzana company in a different name 
Yuzana 2 138,707 29,734   In Bokepyin Township 
Pokaung 1 2,002 2,002 Without mill Sells FFB to CPO mill in Launglon 
Pokaung 2 27,550 12,100 Without mill 
In Kawthoung and Karathuri Town-
ships 
Htoo trading 700,000 2,075   
Surrendered the land after timber ex-
traction and held the land scaling down 
to 30,000 acres; U Tayza’s company 
Myanmar Naing 70,000 
No plant-
ing 
No palm oil estate 
nor mill 
Company belonging to the son of a 
former senior general in the military 
government 
Dagon Timber 18,601 13,378 Without mill Sells FFB to Yuzana CPO mill 
Aungzin mar 10,000 5,690 Without mill Sells FFB to Yuzana CPO mill 
South Dagon 13,245 8,646 30 ton/hr mill (1) 
Mill structures locally fabricated; 150 T/
d refinery mill (1) in Yangon 
Taung Pine Shwe 
Yaung 
7,200 150 Without mill   
Shwe Kan Bawza 39,314 7,205 2 ton/hr mill (1) Locally-made small mill 
Myan Naing 
Myint 
2,308 2,308 Small CPO mill (1)   
Asia World 10,200 10,200 Small CPO mill (1)   








Annawa soe moe 6,000 6,000 Without mill Sells FFB to CPO mill in Launglon 
Steel Stone 3,000 2,067 Without mill Sells FFB to CPO mill in Launglon 
Shwe padoma 1,200 300 Small mill   
Evergreen 7,000 -     
Super One 750 750   Sells FFB to Yuzana CPO mill 
Shwe Ahhon 49,600 246 No mill 
Applies to DICA for JV with Malaysia; 
the company of the former Chief of the 
Police Forces; if focus on palm oil ra-
ther than timber extraction, it will be a 
big player 
Arm Strong 1,500 375 No mill   
Aung Ye Phyo 200 200 No mill   
Coastal Develop-
ment 
2,000 200 No mill   
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 Auto Industrial 
Group (AIG) 
133,600 100   
100 percent investment by Korean 
company in partnership with the Minis-
try of Agriculture on a product share 
basis 
Taw Win Shwe 
Pale 
42,200 350 No mill 
Partnership plan to work with a Malay-
sian company, named as Prestige 
Plantation Company, with proposed 
equity share of 80 percent from Malay-
sia; applied to DICA 
Pyae Phyo Htun 21,895 3,635 Small mill   
Vintage 2 1,520 720   Start to plant 
Thein Khun 500 405   Start to plant 
Sein Lan Htar 
Nay 
5,400 150   Start to plant 
Myanmar Aveior 775 775 No mill   
Tat Nay 1,500 1413 Small mill   
CKB 2,000 1,876 Small mill   
Maung Wait 1,020 1,020   Abandoned due to a personal problem 
SI 42,200 40   
Applied to DICA for partnership with a 
Malaysian company involved in timber 
extraction in Africa; local people sus-
pect it will be exploiting timber instead 




17,000 450     
Dawai Company 20,000 -     
Sein Pyae Shan 
Aung 
10,000 -     
MEC 6,539 6,539   Myanmar Economic Holdings 
Myanmar Awba 18,500 -     
Source: Regional Department of Industrial Crops Development, MoAI, Dawai. 
FFB= Fresh fruit bunch (commercial output of palm oil) 
CPO = Crude palm oil extracted from FFB 
DICA= Directorate of Investment and Companies Administration 
FDI= Foreign Direct Investment 




 Annex 6 - Other types of land use in reserved forests and protected 






Source: Forest Department, Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry (MoECAF) now 
changed to Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation (MoNREC)  
 
 
Category of land use Acres 
Gold/minerals 7,883.45 
Teak/hard wood (private plantations) 281,199.53 
LSLA to ABCs for rubber/sugarcane/ other crops 370,731.54 
LSLA to ABCs for palm oil 458,585.00 
Dam water reservoirs 348,233.40 
Encroachment (by local farmers and others) 1,681,667.62 
Total 3,168,300.54 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Magwae Minhla 2617 2617 
Ayeyawaddy 
  
Nyaung Done 1402   
Pantanaw 19336 20738 
Annawahtun (Other name of 
Yuzana) 
ditto 
Kamauk Gyi, karathuri, 
Bokepyin 
30900 30900 
Shwe Myae yadana (Other 
name of Yuzana) 
ditto Karathuri 25000 25000 
Total acres of Yuzana  514,169 
Htoo Trading Co. 




Taninthary 70625 70625 
  
  
Bokepyin   
Kamauk Gyi   
Magwae 
  
Pyint Phyu 6455 10037 
  Minbu 3582 
Shan-North Yak Sauk 8050 8050 
 
Ayer Shwe Wah 













Ye Kyi 7318 
Kyaung Kone 1627 
Kan Gyi Daunk 3779 
Total acres of Htoo Trading 124,031 
 
Source: LSLA allocated to companies and individuals, 2010, DAP report 
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 Annex 9 - Area of land allocated (acres) in three districts of Tanintharyi 
Region (as of the end of November 2012) for palm oil and rubber 
plantations 
Source: Office of the Tanintharyi Regional Government, December, 2012. 
(Remark: Palm oil land is concentrated in Kawthaung District while natural rubber plantation land 
is situated in Dawei and Myeik Districts)  
District 
Fallow/Virgin Reserved Forest/ Protected Forest Total Acres 
Applied Allocated Applied Allocated Applied Allocated 
Dawei 26,948 26,940 68,166.6 8,147.5 95,106.6 35,087.5 
Myeik 76,873 76,873 556,833.0 9,194.7 633,706.1 86,067.7 
Kawthaung 383,824 383,824 142,184.6 68,762.0 526,008.6 452,506.0 
Total 487,637 487,637 767,184.2 86,104.2 1,254,821.3 573,741.2 
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 The Mekong Region Land Governance Project aims to contribute to the design of 
appropriate land policies and practices in the Mekong Region. It responds to national priorities 
in terms of reducing poverty, improving tenure security, increasing economic development, and 
supporting family farmers, so that they can be secure and make good decisions on land use 
and land management. MRLG is operating in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Viet Nam since 
April 2014, with the support of SDC and the German cooperation. For more information on 
MRLG, please visit www.mrlg.org. 
 
The MRLG Thematic Study series examines major themes related to land tenure in the 
Mekong Region. It is aligned with strategic priorities of MRLG and is intended as background 
document for all relevant MRLG partners. As such, the series consists of a synthesis of existing 
references in a particular theme, which can be complemented with additional enquiries and 
studies. The production of Thematic Study is usually undertaken at the initiative of MRLG but 
we also accommodate proposals originating from outside the programme. It is coordinated by 
an editorial steering committee composed of representatives of MRLG, partner organizations 
and invited experts. 
The views, opinions and interpretations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and contributors.  
They should not be interpreted as representing the official or unofficial views or positions of SDC. 
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